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Abstract
We address improving verification performance, as well as security and privacy aspects of bio-
hashing methods in this thesis. We propose various methods to increase the verification perfor-
mance of the random projection based biohashing systems. First, we introduce a new biohash-
ing method based on optimal linear transform which seeks to find a better projection matrix.
Second, we propose another biohashing method based on a discriminative projection selection
technique that selects the rows of the random projection matrix by using the Fisher criterion.
Third, we introduce a new quantization method that attempts to optimize biohashes using the
ideas from diversification of error-correcting output codes classifiers. Simulation results show
that introduced methods improve the verification performance of biohashing.
We consider various security and privacy attack scenarios for biohashing methods. We propose
new attack methods based on minimum l1 and l2 norm reconstructions. The results of these
attacks show that biohashing is vulnerable to such attacks and better template protection methods
are necessary. Therefore, we propose an identity verification system which has new enrollment
and authentication protocols based on threshold homomorphic encryption. The system can be
used with any biometric modality and feature extraction method whose output templates can
be binarized, therefore it is not limited to biohashing. Our analysis shows that the introduced
system is robust against most security and privacy attacks conceived in the literature. In addition,
a straightforward implementation of its authentication protocol is sufficiently fast enough to be
used in real applications.
BI˙YOMETRI˙K KIYIM I˙C¸I˙N ARTTIRILMIS¸ GU¨VENLI˙K VE MAHREMI˙YET KORUMASI
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EE, Doktora Tezi, 2013
Tez Danıs¸manı: HAKAN ERDOG˘AN
Anahtar Kelimeler: Biyometrik Kıyım, Gu¨venlik, Mahremiyet, Kriptografik Protokoller,
Homomorfik S¸ifreleme, ve Es¸ik S¸ifreleme
O¨zet
Bu tezde biyometrik kıyım yo¨ntemlerinin dog˘rulama performanslarının arttırılmasının yanısıra
gu¨venlik ve mahremiyet boyutlarını da ele aldık. Rastgele izdu¨s¸u¨mu¨ tabanlı biyometrik kıyım
yo¨ntemlerinin dog˘rulama performanslarını arttırmak ic¸in c¸es¸itli yo¨ntemler o¨nerdik. lk olarak, en
iyi dog˘rusal do¨nu¨s¸u¨me dayalı daha iyi bir izdu¨s¸u¨mu¨ matrisi bulmaya c¸alıs¸an yeni bir biyometrik
kıyım yo¨ntemi o¨nerdik. kinci olarak, rastgele izdu¨s¸u¨mu¨ matrisinin satırlarını Fisher kriterine
go¨re sec¸en ayrıs¸tırıcı bir izdu¨s¸u¨mu¨ sec¸imi teknig˘ine dayalı biyometrik kıyım yo¨ntemi o¨nerdik.
U¨c¸u¨ncu¨ olarak, biyometrik kıyım dizilerini hata du¨zeltme c¸ıkıs¸ kodları sınıflandırıcılarının c¸es¸it-
lendirilmesi ic¸in kullanılan fikirleri kullanarak optimize etmeye c¸alıs¸an yeni bir nicemleme
yo¨ntemi sunduk.
Biyometrik kıyım yo¨ntemleri ic¸in c¸es¸itli gu¨venlik ve mahremiyet saldırıları du¨s¸u¨ndu¨k. En az l1
ve l2 o¨lc¸u¨tu¨ yeniden yapılandırmalarına dayalı yeni saldırı yo¨ntemleri o¨nerdik. Bu saldırıların
sonuc¸ları biyometrik kıyımın bo¨yle saldırılara kars¸ı kırılgan oldug˘unu ve daha iyi s¸ablon ko-
ruma yo¨ntemlerinin gerekli oldug˘unu go¨stermektedir. Bu yu¨zden, es¸ik homomorfik s¸ifrelemeye
dayalı yeni kayıt ve dog˘rulama protokolleri ic¸eren bir kimlik dog˘rulama sistemi o¨nerdik. Sis-
tem, c¸ıkıs¸ s¸ablonları ikili sayı dizisi haline getirilebilen herhangi bir biyometrik tu¨r ve o¨znitelik
c¸ıkarma yo¨ntemi ile c¸alıs¸abilir, bo¨ylece biyometrik kıyım ile sınırlı deg˘ildir. Yaptıg˘ımız ana-
lizler sundug˘umuz sistemin literatu¨rde du¨s¸u¨nu¨lmu¨s¸ birc¸ok gu¨venlik ve mahremiyet saldırılarına
kars¸ı dayanıklı oldug˘unu go¨stermektedir. Ek olarak, sistemin dog˘rulama protokolu¨nu¨n basit bir
gerc¸eklenmesi gerc¸ek hayat uygulanmalarında kullanılabilecek derece hızlıdır.
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Introduction
1.1 Motivation
With the development of computers, Internet and its applications that require authentication,
the number of passwords that users have increased enormously in the digital age. Thus, users
cannot generate and remember sufficiently strong keys, that are difficult to guess, for various
applications. An alternative approach depends on authentication using biometrics that use phys-
iological and/or behavioral traits (e.g. face, fingerprint, iris) for verifying the identity of individ-
uals [5, 6]. Recent years have seen increased usage of biometric verification systems in many
applications. Public and commercial organizations invest on secure electronic authentication
(e-authentication) systems to reliably verify identity of individuals. Biometrics is one of the
rapidly emerging technologies for e-authentication systems [7]. It offers several advantages (i.e.
no need to remember your password, user friendly and convenient, cannot be shared, unique
characteristics of individuals) over the traditional password based authentication systems. In
biometric authentication systems, an input biometric template is compared to the reference bio-
metric template either stored in a database server or a smart card for verification. The reference
biometric template is stored as plaintext in a database or a smart card in most such systems.
It is impossible to discuss biometrics without security and privacy issues [1, 8]. Biometrics,
which are stored in a smart card or a central database, is under security and privacy risks due
to increased number of attacks against identity management systems in recent years [1, 8–10].
These systems are deemed insecure and raise about security and privacy concerns [11, 12]. A
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Figure 1.1: Three main aspects of biohashing methods.
proposed solution to handle aforementioned threats is to encrypt the reference biometric tem-
plate stored in a smart card or a database by using cryptographic algorithms [13, 14]. The main
problem of such solutions is that the encrypted reference biometric template must be decrypted
to compare it with the claimer’s input biometric template. This makes the systems weak against
possible attacks at the verification stage.
Cancelable biometrics that combine the biometric with a secret key to enable randomized bio-
metric hashing is a promising solution to cope with such problems [2, 15–17]. Biohashing
schemes are one of the emerging biometric template protection methods [16, 18–21]. These
methods offer low error rates and fast verification at the authentication stage. However, they
suffer from several attacks reported in the literature [17, 22–24]. These schemes should be
improved in order to be safely used in a wide range of real life applications.
In this thesis, we address three main aspects of biohashing methods as illustrated in Figure 1.1.
These are
1. Performance aspects
2. Security aspects
3. Privacy aspects
First, we propose new biohashing methods in order to improve the verification performance of
the existing random projection based biohashing methods. There are three main phases in a
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biohashing method: 1) Feature extraction, 2)Dimension reduction, and 3)Quantization. We try
to improve the verification performance by proposing new techniques in the dimension reduction
and the quantization phases which have a large effect on the verification errors. We also take into
account the key-stolen scenario where an attacker acquires the secret key of a legitimate user
because if we assume that the key is always unknown, there would be no need for biometrics
since it would be impossible to break into a system. The additional benefit of biometrics needs
to be quantified. Our proposed methods have superior performance in comparison with the
existing methods.
In addition to that, we address security and privacy aspects of the biohashing schemes. Although
it is stated that random projection based biohashing methods satisfy irreversibility and cancela-
bility property, we demonstrate that they cannot guarantee to satisfy these properties under some
circumstances. We define some attack scenarios and perform them against a random projection
based biohashing method in order to demonstrate security threats. For privacy threats, we focus
on testing the irreversibility property of a biohash vector and try to obtain the biometric data
under certain conditions.
Finally, we propose a new biometric verification system in order to cope with security and pri-
vacy flaws of the biohashing methods. The proposed system can also be seen as a new biometric
template protection method. The proposed system includes novel enrollment and authentication
protocols based on a threshold homomorphic cryptosystem in which the private key is shared
between the user and the verifier. The system is designed for the malicious attack model where
neither of the parties is assumed to be honest. Security of the system is enhanced using a two fac-
tor authentication scheme involving the users private key and the biometric data. In the proposed
system, only encrypted binary biometric templates are stored in the database and verification is
performed via homomorphically randomized templates, hence, original templates are never re-
vealed even during authentication. Since threshold homomorphic encryption scheme is used, a
malicious party cannot perform decryption on encrypted templates of the users in the database
using a single key.
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1.2 Contributions
In this thesis, we address verification performance and security and privacy preservation aspects
of biohashing schemes. First, we develop new biohashing schemes in order to increase the veri-
fication performance even under the key-stolen scenario. Then, we analyze security and privacy
gaps of the existing biohashing schemes and we discuss some possible attacks. Then, we develop
a new biometric authentication system by taking into account previous attacks. Consequently,
The contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
1. We develop a new face image hashing method based on an optimal linear transformation
[25]. In the proposed method, first, we apply a feature extraction method. Then, we define
an optimal linear transformation matrix based on within-class covariance matrix which
is the maximum likelihood estimate of the variations of the biometric data belonging
to the same user. Next, we reduce the dimension of the feature vector by using this
transform. Finally, we apply quantization and obtain a face image hash vector. We test
the performance of the proposed method with various face databases and show that it has
better performance even under the key-stolen scenario in comparison with the random
projection (RP) based biohashing methods in the literature.
2. We develop a new biohashing scheme whose title is “Discriminative Projection Selection
Based Face Image Hashing” [26]. In this work, we improve the performance of the
random projection (RP) based biohashing schemes. The proposed method selects the
rows of an RP matrix, which is a user dependent dimension reduction matrix, by using the
Fisher criterion [27]. We also employ Gaussian mixture model (GMM) at the quantization
step to obtain more distinct face image hash vectors for each user. The proposed method
has better performance even under the key-stolen scenario in comparison with the RP
based biohashing methods in the literature.
3. We develop a new biohashing scheme whose title is “Error-Correcting Output Codes
Guided Quantization For Biometric Hashing” [28]. In this work, we improve the perfor-
mance of the RP based biohashing schemes by introducing a new quantization method that
attempts to optimize biometric hash vectors by using some ideas from Error-Correcting
Output Codes (ECOC) classifiers. The proposed scheme shows superior performance
even under the key-stolen scenario.
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4. We analyze security and privacy gaps of the biohashing schemes. We perform irreversibil-
ity attacks and show that these attacks can threaten the privacy of the users. We also
demonstrate that these attacks can threaten the security of the system since they allow an
adversary to gain access with a high probability.
5. We develop a novel biometric authentication system which we call “THRIVE: Threshold
Homomorphic encRyption based secure and privacy preserving bIometric VErification
system” by taking into account the attacks against biohashing schemes [29]. It can be
used in the applications where the user does not trust the verifier since the user does not
need to reveal her biometric template and/or private key in order to authenticate herself
and the verifier does not need to reveal any data to the user at the proposed authentication
protocol. It is a two-factor authentication system (biometric and secret key) and is secure
against illegal authentication attempts. In other words, a malicious adversary cannot gain
access to the proposed system without having the biometric data and the private key of a
legitimate user by performing adversary attacks described in [4] as well as hill-climbing
attacks [30–33]. In the THRIVE system, the generated protected biometric templates are
irreversible since they are encrypted.The proposed THRIVE system is developed in the
malicious model and can be used with any existing biometric modality whose output can
be binarized (not only with biohashing schemes). The THRIVE system lets only a legit-
imate user to enroll since signature scheme is used at the proposed enrollment stage. It
is a new and advanced biometric template protection method without any helper data and
only encrypted versions of binary templates are stored in the database and they are never
released even during authentication. The THRIVE system also offers high level security
and privacy features i.e. even if an adversary gains an access to the database and steals en-
crypted biometric templates, neither he can authenticate himself by using these encrypted
biometric templates due to the authentication protocol nor he can decrypt these encrypted
biometric templates due to the (2, 2)-threshold homomorphic encryption scheme. Further-
more, neither the verifier nor the user can perform decryption by themselves on encrypted
biometric templates since the (2, 2)-threshold homomorphic encryption scheme is used.
Instead, the verifier and the user can perform decryption collaboratively using their own
private key shares. The verifier does not need to know the user’s biometric template or
private key in order to authenticate the user. In this system, authentication is performed
via randomized templates which ensures privacy. Even if an adversary intercepts the
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communication channel between the user and the verifier, he cannot obtain any useful in-
formation on the biometric template since all exchanged messages are randomized and/or
encrypted and he cannot perform decryption due to the (2, 2)-threshold homomorphic en-
cryption scheme. Furthermore, he cannot use the obtained data from message exchanges
in this communication channel since nonce and signature schemes are used together in
the authentication. In the THRIVE system, the generated protected biometric templates
are cancelable. Even if they are stolen, they can be re-generated. It can also generate
a number of protected templates from the same biometric data of a user due to the ran-
domized encryption and biohashing. Thus, it ensures diversity. It is implemented and a
successful authentication protocol run requires 0.218 seconds on average. Consequently,
the proposed system is sufficiently efficient to be used in real world applications.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 focuses on the basic background for the bio-
hashing methods. Chapter 3, Chapter 4, and Chapter 5 address our works on performance
improvement of biohashing methods. Chapter 3 explains a face image hashing method based
on optimal linear transform under colored Gaussian noise assumption [25]. Chapter 4 intro-
duces discriminative projection selection based face image hashing [26]. Chapter 5 is devoted
to error-correcting output codes guided quantization for biometric hashing [28].
In addition to these works, security and privacy aspects of biohashing methods are covered in
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. We address security and privacy attacks against biohashing methods
in Chapter 6. Finally, we propose a novel biometric verification system called “THRIVE” in
Chapter 7 by taking into account the security flaws and privacy threats in the previous chapter
[29]. Finally, we conclude the thesis and discuss the future work in Chapter 8.
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Figure 1.2: Classification of the work that has been performed in this thesis.
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Preliminaries
2.1.1 Biohashing Based Verification System
In recent years, biohashing is one of the emerging biometric template protection methods in the
literature [16, 18–21]. Biohash is a binary and pseudo-random representation of a biometric
template. Biohashing methods use two inputs: 1) Biometric template, 2) User’s secret key.
A biometric feature vector is transformed into a lower dimensional sub-space using a pseudo-
random set of orthogonal vectors which are generated from the user’s secret key. Then, the result
is binarized to produce a bit-string which is called the biohash. In an ideal case, the distance
between the biohashes belonging to the biometric templates of the same user is expected to be
relatively small. On the other hand, the distance between the biohashes belonging to different
users is expected to be sufficiently high to achieve lower false acceptance rates. The desired
properties of the biohashes are summarized as follows:
1. The biohash should be irreversible so that biometric template cannot be obtained from a
biohash vector.
2. The biohash should be cancelable so that it can be renewed when an attacker steals it.
3. The biohash should be robust against different biometric images belonging to the same
user so that the Hamming distance between the biohash vectors (i.e. generated from the
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same secret key but different biometric image collected at different session) of the same
user should be small.
4. Biohash should be fragile to the biometric images which do not belong to the same legiti-
mate user so that the Hamming distance between the biohash vectors (i.e. generated from
different secret key and different biometric image) of the different users should be high.
Biohashing based verification systems perform an automatic verification of a user based on her
specific biometric data and secret key. There are two main stages in these systems:
1. Enrollment stage,
2. Authentication stage.
The user is enrolled to the system at the enrollment stage. Then, the user again provides her
biometric data to the system at the authentication stage in order to prove her identity. Biohashing
schemes are simple yet powerful biometric template protection methods [16, 18–21]. In this part,
we describe the random projection (RP) based biohashing scheme proposed by Ngo et al. [2].
In a RP based biohashing method, there are three main phases in each stage and these phases
are described as follows:
1. Feature extraction,
2. Dimension reduction,
3. Quantization.
These three phases for the face biometric are explained in the following.
2.1.1.1 Enrollment Stage
In the enrollment stage, a user enrolls to the biometric verification system by giving her face
image and secret key to the system. Then, the system computes her biohash and stores it for
verification purposes at the authentication system.
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of biohashing based verification.
Feature Extraction At this phase, a user gives her face image, Ienroll ∈ Rm×n, to the system.
The face image is lexicographically re-ordered and the face vector, xenroll ∈ R(mn)×1, is obtained.
Then, principle component analysis [34] is applied to it for feature extraction as follows:
yenroll = A(xenroll − µ), (2.1)
where A ∈ Rk×(mn) is the pre-computed PCA matrix trained by the face images in the training set,
µ is the pre-computed mean face vector by the face images in the training set, and yenroll ∈ Rk×1
is the vector containing PCA coefficients belonging to the user.
Dimension Reduction At this phase, a RP matrix, R ∈ R`×k, is generated to reduce the
dimension of the PCA coefficient vectors. The RP matrix elements are independent and iden-
tically distributed (i.i.d) and generated from a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit
variance by using a Random Number Generator (RNG) with a seed derived from the user’s
secret key. The Gram-Schmidt (GS) procedure is applied to obtain an orthonormal projection
matrix RGS ∈ R`×k to have more distinct projections. Finally, PCA coefficients are projected
onto a lower `-dimensional subspace as follows:
zenroll = RGS yenroll, (2.2)
where zenroll ∈ R`×1 is the intermediate biohash vector belonging to the user.
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2.1.1.2 Quantization
At this phase, the intermediate biohash vector zenroll elements are binarized with respect to a
threshold as follows:
Benroll (i) =
 1 if zenroll (i) ≥ β,0 Otherwise, (2.3)
where i = 1, . . . , `, Benroll ∈ {0, 1}` denotes biohash vector of the user and β is the mean value
of the intermediate biohash vector zenroll.
The computed binary biohashes are stored in the database in the enrollment stage for verification
purpose during the authentication stage.
2.1.1.3 Authentication Stage
In the authentication stage, exactly same operations are performed on the biometric face image
supplied by the user. The user is authenticated when the Hamming distance between Benroll
(which denotes the biohash of the user generated at the enrollment stage) and Bauth (which de-
notes the biohash of the user generated at the authentication stage) is below a distance threshold
t as follows:
d (Benroll,Bauth) =
∑`
i=1
Benroll (i) ⊕ Bauth (i) ≤ t, (2.4)
where d (Benroll,Bauth) denotes the Hamming distance between Benroll and Bauth, ⊕ denotes the
binary XOR (exclusive OR) operator and t denotes the decision threshold. Therefore, the verifier
decides whether the user is legitimate or not using the decision threshold.
2.1.2 Performance Measures for Biometric Verification
In a biometric verification system, a user must first claim that he/she is someone who has been
enrolled into the system, and the system then determines if the users claim is true or false. The
biometric verification system makes a decision by using the below decision function:
Background 12
decision =
 accept if d (Benroll,Bauth) < t,reject Otherwise, (2.5)
where d (Benroll,Bauth) denotes the Hamming distance between the biohashes computed at the
enrollment and the authentication stages as in Eq. 2.4 and t denotes the decision threshold.
In this part, we describe performance measures for biometric verification used in this thesis.
The verification performance of biometric systems is usually expressed in terms of their False
Acceptance Rate (FAR), False Rejection Rate (FRR) and the related Equal Error Rate (EER). In
addition to these metrics, there are some performance charts like detection error tradeoff (DET)
graph which plots FRR versus FAR [35]. These metrics and charts are used for reflecting the
system performance.
The biometric verification systems may make two types of errors due to the accept/reject out-
comes i.e., false acceptance (FA) and false rejection (FR). For biohashing based verification
systems, FAR is an empirical estimate of the probability (the percentage of times) at which the
system incorrectly accepts a biohash of the claimer when the biohash actually belongs to a dif-
ferent user (impostor). In other words, it is the case where the system falsely accepts the claim
although the actual claimer is an impostor. On the other hand, FRR is an empirical estimate of
the probability (the percentage of times) at which the system incorrectly rejects a biohash of the
claimer when the biohash actually belongs to the genuine user. In other words, it is the case
where the system falsely rejects a genuine users claim. The FAR and FRR of the corresponding
system can be estimated in the following ways:
FRR(t) =
FA (t)
Ng
, (2.6)
and
FAR(t) =
FR (t)
Ni
, (2.7)
where FA and FR count the number of FA and FR accesses respectively; and Ng and Ni denote
the total number of genuine and imposter accesses respectively.
FAR and FRR curves can be plotted as a function of the decision threshold. The FAR is a
monotonically increasing function of the decision threshold whereas the FRR is a monotonically
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of a DET curve. Each point on a DET curve corresponds to a specific
threshold value although threshold values are not evident from the curve. EER can be found
from the intersection of the DET curve with a straight line hugging the left and the top borders.
decreasing function of the decision threshold. Therefore, it is impossible to minimize the two
error rates simultaneously. EER is related with the FAR and the FRR. It is the rate at which the
FAR is equal to the FRR for a certain threshold te.
EER = FRR (te) = FAR (te) . (2.8)
The DET curve plots FRR versus FAR for all possible values of the threshold t but the axes
are often scaled non-linearly to highlight the region of error rates of interest. Commonly used
scales include normal deviate scale and logarithmic scale. It is similar to receiver operating
characteristics (ROC) curve (which plots probability of correct acceptance (1-FRR) in the Y-
axis versus FAR in the X-axis) except that the axes are often scaled non-linearly to highlight the
region of error rates of interest. An example DET curve can be seen in Figure 2.2.
2.1.3 Principle Component Analysis (PCA)
PCA is one of the most common feature extraction techniques which is used for face images
in the literature [34]. PCA can be used in a number of applications e.g. face recognition, data
compression. PCA is the optimum linear dimensionality reduction technique with respect to
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mean squared error (MSE) of the reconstruction for a given data set. The basic steps of the PCA
is as follows:
1. We are given a set of M training face images Ii ∈ Rm×n where i = 1, . . . ,M. We lexico-
graphically re-order them in order to obtain face vectors xi ∈ RK×1 where K = m × n. We
compute the sample mean, µ, of the face vectors as follows:
µ =
1
M
K∑
i=1
xi. (2.9)
Then, we subtract the sample mean face image vector from the training face image vectors.
ti = xi − µ. (2.10)
2. We compute covariance matrix C of the training face vectors
C =
1
M
M∑
i=1
(xi − µ) (xi − µ)T = 1M
M∑
i=1
(ti) (ti)T = BBT , (2.11)
where B = [t1, t2, · · · , tM] ∈ RK×M.
3. We want to compute eigenvalues λ j’s and eigenvectors of C, however, computing the
eigenvectors of C is not an easy task for typical face image sizes when K  M . Thus,
we first compute the eigenvectors of the much-smaller M × M matrix B>B in order
to efficiently compute the eigenvectors, U= {u1, . . . ,uL}, of C. Here, the eigenvalues of
B>B and BB> are the same whereas their eigenvectors are different. The singular value
decomposition of B is as follows:
B = UΣVT , (2.12)
where U∈ RK×K is a unitary matrix, Σ ∈ RK×M is a rectangular diagonal matrix with non-
negative real numbers on the diagonal, and VT ∈ RM×M is a unitary matrix. The diagonal
entries of Σ matrix are known as the singular values of B. The eigendecomposition of
B>B and BB> are as follows:
BT B = VΣ2VT , (2.13)
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BBT = UΣ2UT . (2.14)
From Eq. 2.12 the eigenvectors of BB> can be computed as follows:
U = BVΣ−1, (2.15)
where diagonal entries of the Σ matrix contains the square root of the eigenvalues of BB> .
4. We define a projection matrix A composed of N eigenvectors of C with highest eigenval-
ues U= {u1, . . . ,uN} as follows:
A =

uT1
...
uTN
 , (2.16)
where u1 is the eigenvector of C with the highest eigenvalue.
5. Finally, we can compute the N-dimensional representation of the original K-dimensional
face vector as follows:
yi = A(xi − µ). (2.17)
2.1.4 Random Number Generation
Pseudo random number generation is the process of generating a sequence of numbers using
deterministic computations where an outside observer would consider the sequence as being
randomly generated. The pseudo-random number generators require a seed value to start the
computations and would generate exactly the same sequence of numbers if given the same seed.
Mersenne twister is a pseudo random number generator proposed by Makoto Matsumoto and
Takuji Nishimura [36]. The 32-bit Mersenne twister algorithm produces uniformly random
integers between 0 and 232 − 1 and its period is approximately 106001. The integer values can be
normalized to generate what appears to be uniformly random real values between 0 and 1.
The rand(.) function in MATLAB generates a uniformly distributed pseudo-random number by
using this algorithm. The rand(′state′, s) causes the rand(.) function to initialize the generator
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with the seed s which is a scalar integer. The user’s secret key is used as a seed in order to
generate random numbers for the random projection matrix. We generate a matrix containing
pseudo-random values drawn from the standard uniform distribution on the open interval (0, 1).
Let the random projection matrix be R ∈ R`×k and let r (i, j) denote the element located at the
ith row and jth column of R. In this case, the random variable r (i, j) has the standard uniform
distribution with minimum 0 and maximum 1.
2.2 Related Work
Security and privacy concerns on biometrics limit their widespread usage in real life appli-
cations. The initial solution that comes to mind for security and privacy problems is to use
cryptographic primitives. On the other hand, biometric templates cannot be directly used with
conventional encryption techniques (i.e. AES, 3DES) since biometric data are inherently noisy
[37]. In other words, the user is not able to present exactly the same biometric data repeat-
edly. Namely, when a biometric template is encrypted during the enrollment stage, it should be
decrypted to pass the authentication stage for comparison with the presented biometric. This,
however, again leads to security and privacy issues for biometric templates at the authentication
stage [37]. Another problem with regards to such a solution is the key management, i.e. stor-
age of encryption keys. When a malicious database manager obtains encryption keys, he can
perform decryption and obtain biometric templates of all users. Similar problems are valid for
cryptographic hashing methods. Since cryptographic hash is a one-way function, when a single
bit is changed the hash sum becomes completely different due to the avalanche effect [38]. Thus,
successful authentication by exact matching cannot be performed even for legitimate users due
to the noisy nature of biometric templates. Therefore, biometric templates also cannot directly
be used with traditional cryptographic hashing methods.
Biometric systems which use error correction methods are proposed in order to cope with noisy
nature of the biometric templates in the literature [39–41]. In such systems, after using error
correction, the biometric data collected at the authentication stage can become exactly the same
with the biometric data collected at the enrollment stage due to tolerance to a limited number
of errors brought by the error correction methods. In other words, these systems can get error-
free biometric templates and thus cryptographic primitives (i.e. encryption and hashing) can
successfully be employed without suffering from the avalanche effect [13, 37, 41, 42]. However,
large error correcting capability requirements makes them impractical for real life applications
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[43]. Furthermore, side information (parity bits) is needed for error correction and this may
lead to information leakage and even other attacks (i.e., error correcting code statistics, and non-
randomness attacks) [44]. Besides, Zhou et al. clearly demonstrate in their work that redundancy
in an error correction code causes privacy leakage for biometric systems [45].
Biohashing schemes are simple yet powerful biometric template protection methods [16, 18–
21]. It is worth pointing out that biohashing is completely different from cryptographic hashing.
In the literature, researchers propose various biometric hashing methods which mostly depend
on random projections where the biometric template is projected over a set of randomly selected
orthogonal vectors [2, 3, 16–18, 46]. They argue that even when an attacker steals the biometric
hash vector, he cannot obtain the original biometric template. Thus, their scheme preserves
privacy of the users. In these works, they propose a two factor authentication based on a user-
defined password and a biometric template. The feature extraction phase of a biometric system
is randomized by using iterated inner products between a tokenized pseudo-random vector and
the user specific biometric features. The features may be generated from principal component
analysis (PCA), Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) and Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA)
etc. Finally, they employ binary quantization to obtain face image hash vectors. Eventually, they
produce a set of user specific biometric code that they called biometric hash or biohash.
There are various works on biohashing methods that uses different biometric modalities. Ngo et
al. [2, 3] and Karabat et al. [26, 28] propose random projection based biohashing methods for
face images whereas Lumini et al. [16] work on fingerprint based biohashing methods. On the
other hand, Vielhauer et al. [47] develop a biohashing method based on statistical features in
online signatures. Connie et al. [48] develop a biohashing method for palmprints. In addition to
these works, there are other biohashing methods which works with multimodal biometrics. For
instance, Fuksis et al.[49] propose a biohashing method based on fusion of data coming from
palmprint and palm vein.
Although biohashing schemes are proposed to solve security and privacy issues, there are still
security and privacy issues associated with them [16, 17, 22–24]. Lumini et al. [16] report
that when the secret keys are compromised, biohashing methods cannot achieve near zero equal
error rate (EER) and they show that this assumption is unrealistic. They propose a key-stolen
attack scenario and they investigate the performance of the random projection based biohashing
methods when an attacker gets the secret key of a user. In addition to that, other researchers
claim that biohashes can be reversible under certain conditions and an adversary can estimate
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Figure 2.3: General classification of biometric template protection schemes (adapted from [1]).
biometric template of a user from her biohash [17, 22–24]. Consequently, when biohashes are
stored in the databases and/or smart cards in their plain form, they can threaten the security
of the system as well as the privacy of the users. Moreover, an adversary can use an obtained
biohash in order to threaten the system security by performing malicious authentication. When
the secret key is compromised, an adversary may reconstruct a biometric template that resembles
the original template even though an inversion which would yield the exact template may not be
possible. Thus, these schemes are considered as “generally invertible” in some publications [1].
In the literature, Jain et al. classify biometric template protection schemes into two main cate-
gories [1]: 1) Feature transformation based schemes, 2) Biometric cryptosystems as illustrated
in Figure 2.3. Although biometric template protection methods are proposed to overcome secu-
rity and privacy problems of biometrics [1, 18–21, 26, 28, 50–58], recent research shows that
security and privacy issues still persist for these schemes [16, 17, 22–24, 59–61]. Furthermore,
there are a number of works on privacy leakages of biometric template protection methods in
the literature [45, 62–65]. Zhou et al. propose a framework for security and privacy assessment
of biometric template protection methods [45]. Ignatenko et al. analyze the privacy leakage in
terms of the mutual information between the public helper data and biometric features in a bio-
metric template protection method. A trade-off between maximum secret key rate and privacy
leakage is given in their works [63, 66].
The main idea behind biometric cryptosystems (also known as biometric encryption systems) is
either binding a cryptographic key with a biometric template or generating the cryptographic key
directly from the biometric template [67]. Thus, the biometric cryptosystems can be classified
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into two main categories: 1) Key binding schemes, 2) Key generation schemes. Biometric
cryptosystems use helper data, which is public information, about the biometric template for
verification. Although helper data are supposed not to leak any critical information about the
biometric template, Rathgeb et al. show that helper data is vulnerable to statistical attacks
[68]. Furthermore, Ignatenko et al. show how to compute a bound on possible secret rate and
privacy leakage rate for helper data schemes [69]. Adler performs hill-climbing attack against
biometric encryption systems [60]. Besides, Stoianov et al. propose several attacks (i.e., nearest
impostors, error correcting code statistics, and non-randomness attacks) to biometric encryption
systems [44].
In the literature, fuzzy commitment [41] and fuzzy vault schemes [58] are categorized under the
key binding schemes. These schemes aim to bind a cryptographic key with a biometric template.
In ideal conditions, it is infeasible to recover either the biometric template or the random bit
string without any knowledge of the user’s biometric data. However, this is not the case in
reality because biometric templates are not uniformly random. Furthermore, error correction
codes (ECC) used in biometric cryptosystems lead to statistical attacks (i.e., running ECC in
a soft decoding or erasure mode and ECC Histogram attack) [44, 70]. Ignatenko et al. show
that fuzzy commitment schemes leak information in cryptographic keys and biometric templates
which leads to security flaws and privacy concerns [63, 66]. In addition, Zhou et al. argue that
fuzzy commitment schemes leak private data. Chang et al. describe a non-randomness attack
against the fuzzy vault scheme which causes distinction between the minutiae points and the
chaff points [71]. Moreover, Kholmatov et al. perform a correlation attack against the fuzzy
vault schemes [72].
Keys are generated from helper data and a given biometric template in key generation schemes
[1]. Fuzzy key extraction schemes are classified under key generation schemes and use helper
data [73–77]. These schemes can be used as an authentication mechanism where a user is
verified by using her own biometric template as a key. Although fuzzy key extraction schemes
provide key generation from biometric templates, repeatability of the generated key (in other
words stability) and the randomness of the generated keys (in other words entropy) are two
major problems of them [1]. Boyen et al. describe several vulnerabilities (i.e. improper fuzzy
sketch constructions may leak information on the secret, biased codes may cause majority vote
attack, and permutation leaks) of the fuzzy key extraction schemes from outsider and insider
attacker perspectives [78]. Moreover, Li et al. mention that when an adversary obtains sketches,
they may reveal the identity of the users [79].
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Biohashing schemes are simple yet powerful biometric template protection methods [16, 18–21]
which can be classified under salting based schemes. It is worth pointing out that biohashing is
completely different from cryptographic hashing. Although biohashing schemes are proposed
to solve security and privacy issues, there are still security and privacy issues associated with
them [17, 22–24]. In these works, the authors claim that biohashes can be reversible under
certain conditions and an adversary can estimate biometric template of a user from her biohash.
Consequently, when biohashes are stored in the databases and/or smart cards in their plain form,
they can threaten the security of the system as well as the privacy of the users. Moreover, an
adversary can use an obtained biohash in order to threaten the system security by performing
malicious authentication.
Non-invertible transform based schemes use a non-invertible transformation function, which
is a one-way function, to make the biometric template secure [80–82]. User’s secret key de-
termines the parameters of non-invertible transformation function and this secret key should
be provided at the authentication stage. Even if an adversary obtains the secret key and/or the
transformed biometric template, it is computationally hard to recover the original biometric tem-
plate. On the other hand, these schemes suffer from the trade-off between discriminability and
non-invertibility which limits their recognition performance [1].
Apart from the aforementioned schemes, another approach is the use of cryptographic prim-
itives (i.e. encryption, hashing) to protect biometric templates. These works generally focus
on fingerprint-based biometric systems. Tuyls et al. propose a fingerprint authentication sys-
tem which incorporates cryptographic hashes [83]. They use an error correction scheme to get
exactly the same biometric template from the same user in each session which is similar to
the fuzzy key extraction schemes. They store cryptographic hashes of biometric templates in
the database and make comparison in the hash domain. However, there is no guarantee to get
exactly the same biometric templates from the user even if the system incorporates an error cor-
rection scheme in real life applications since it is limited with the pre-defined threshold of error
correction capacity. They also use helper data which are sent over a public channel and this
may lead to security flaws as well. Apart from that, an adversary can threaten the security of the
system when he performs an attack against the database since he can obtain the user id, helper
data and the hashed version of the secret which is generated by the biometric data and the helper
data. Although the adversary cannot obtain the biometric data itself in its plain form, he can get
all needed credentials (i.e. hash values of the secrets) in order to gain access to the system.
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Nowadays, homomorphic encryption methods are used with biometric feature extraction meth-
ods in order to perform verification via encrypted biometric templates [54, 84–86]. These meth-
ods, however, offer solutions in the honest-but-curious model where each party is obliged to
follow the protocol but can arbitrarily analyze the knowledge that it learns during the execution
of the protocol in order to obtain some additional information. Their proposed system is not
designed for the malicious model where each party can arbitrarily deviate from the protocol and
may be corrupted. On the other hand, they do not take into account security and privacy issues
of biometric templates stored in the database [54, 86]. The authors state that their security model
will be improved in the future work by applying encryption methods also on the biometric tem-
plates stored in the database. Furthermore, some of these systems are just designed for a single
biometric modality or a specific feature extraction method which limits their application areas
[84, 85]. Apart from that, an adversary can enroll himself on behalf of any user to their systems
since they do not offer any solutions for malicious enrollment. Finally, all these systems suffer
from computational complexity.
Kerschbaum et al. propose a protocol in order to compare fingerprint templates without actually
exchanging them by using secure multi-party computation in the honest-but-curious model [87].
At the enrollment stage, the user gives her fingerprint template, minutiae pairs and PIN to the
system. Thus, the verifier knows the fingerprint templates which are collected at the enrollment
stage. Although the user does not send her biometric data at the authentication, the verifier al-
ready has the user’s enrolled biometric data and this threatens the privacy of the user in case of a
malicious verifier. In addition to that, a malicious verifier can use these fingerprint templates for
malicious authentication. Furthermore, since the fingerprint comparison reveals the matching
scores (i.e. Hamming distance), the attacker can perform a hill climbing attack against this sys-
tem. Apart from these security and privacy flaws, the authors just focus on secure comparison
in their protocol and they do not develop any solutions for the malicious model.
Erkin et al. [84] propose a privacy preserving face recognition system for the eigen-face recog-
nition algorithm [34]. They design a protocol that performs operations on encrypted images by
using the Pailler homomorphic encryption scheme. Then, Sadeghi et al. improve the efficiency
of this system [85]. In their work, they merge the eigen-face recognition algorithm with homo-
morphic encryption schemes. However, they limit the recognition performance of the system
with the eigen-face method although there are various feature extraction methods which per-
form better than it. Unfortunately, their system cannot be used for any other feature extraction
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method for face images. Moreover, they do not employ a threshold cryptosystem which pre-
vents from a malicious party aiming to perform decryption by himself. Storing face images (or
corresponding feature vectors) in the database in plain is the most serious security flaw of this
system. An adversary, who gains access to the database, can obtain all face images. Therefore,
the adversary can perform an attack against the database which definitely threatens the security
of the system and the privacy of the users.
Barni et al. [54, 86] propose a privacy preservation system for fingercode templates by using
homomorphic encryption in the honest-but-curious model. However, they do not propose any
security and privacy solutions on the biometric templates stored in the database. This issue is
mentioned as future work in their paper. In addition to that, they do not employ threshold en-
cryption which would prevent from a malicious party aiming to perform decryption by himself.
Therefore, their proposed system is open to adversary attacks against the database as stated in
their work as well. They do not address the malicious enrollment issue as well. Moreover,
the user should trust the server in their system. Although they achieve better performance than
[84, 85] in terms of bandwidth saving and time efficiency, they do not address the applications
where the user and the verifier do not trust each other (e.g. the malicious model).
Chapter 3
A Face Image Hashing Method Based
on Optimal Linear Transform Under
Colored Gaussian Noise Assumption
3.1 Introduction
1 In this chapter, the aim is to find a better projection matrix in order to reduce the Hamming
distance between the biometric hash vectors which represent the same user but differ due to
variations in the biometric data. This projection matrix is found by using the optimal linear
transform under colored Gaussian noise assumption [25]. In the literature, Mihcak et al. worked
on the optimal dimension reduction problem for various digital communication problems in their
work [88]. They have modeled the noise between the transmitter and receiver as additive colored
Gaussian noise. The model also assumes the noise is independent of the source signal. Finally,
they derive a formula for the set of optimal linear transforms to reduce the dimension of the data
transmitted through this noisy channel minimizing the probability of error under the assumptions
[88].
The additive colored Gaussian channel noise between the transmitter and receiver can be used
to model the acquisition variability of the biometric images of the same user. In other words,
the user gives different images to the system at each enrollment/authentication session. Thus,
1This chapter is based on [25].
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there are a number of different face images belonging to the same user in the system. We as-
sume that difference between the face images belonging to the same user can be modeled as
additive colored Gaussian noise. We have adopted this approach to the biometric hashing meth-
ods and develop a new biometric hashing method which is based on the within-class covariance
matrix. This optimal linear transformation enables us to better define the biometric face images
in a reduced dimensional space. Thus, the proposed method improves the performance of the
biometric verification systems in comparison with biometric hashing methods proposed in the
literature that are based on random projections [2, 3, 16–18, 46]. The set of linear transforms
derived in [88] still allows using random linear projections, so that the random nature of biohash
extraction is also preserved in our approach.
The performance of the proposed face image hashing method increases with the increasing bio-
metric feature vector length as well as the increasing biometric hash vector length. In other
words, we get better performance with the higher dimension in biometric hash vector. It is
obvious that the performance of the proposed method also depends on the database.
3.2 The Biometric Verification System Based on the Proposed Face
Image Hashing Method
In this section, we introduce the proposed biometric verification system based on the proposed
face image hashing method. In the proposed biometric verification method, there are two main
stages:
1. Enrollment stage,
2. Authentication stage.
These stages are addressed in the below parts.
3.2.1 Enrollment Stage
In this part, we introduce the enrollment stage which consists of three main phases. These are
1. Feature extraction,
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of enrollment stage for the proposed face image hashing method based
on within-class covariance matrix
2. Optimal Linear projection,
3. Quantization.
The enrollment stage is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
3.2.1.1 Feature Extraction Phase
In the feature extraction phase, we first take training face image, Ii, j ∈ Rm×n, i = 1, . . . ,K and
j = 1, . . . , L, where K and L denote number of users and number of images per user respectively.
In simulations, we use two methods in order to extract features from face image. These methods
are well known methods in the literature:
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1. Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) [89] only,
2. Discrete Wavelet Transform followed by Principle Component Analysis (PCA) [34].
Case 1: In this case, we compute the one-level Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) of the
training face images with Haar filter. Then, we only use the coarse level, Xi, j ∈ R(m/2)×(n/2),
in order to represent each training face image. Next, we lexicographically re-order the training
face images and obtain training face vectors, xi, j ∈ RP×1 where P = (m/2) × (n/2).
Case 2: In this case, we compute the one-level Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) of the
training face images with Haar filter. Then, we only use the coarse level, Xi, j ∈ R(m/2)×(n/2), in
order to represent each training face image. Then, we apply principal component analysis in
order to reduce the dimension of the coarse level of discrete wavelet transform Xi, j and obtain
training face vectors, xi, j ∈ RP×1 where P denotes the number of principal components.
3.2.1.2 Optimal Linear Projection Phase
In the literature, Mihcak et al. [88] have defined the original data at transmitter side with X
and its noisy version as noisy data with Y . In this scenario, they assumed that channel noise
(additive colored Gaussian noise) is independent from the original data, X, and have a zero-
mean Gaussian distribution with covariance matrix Σe. In their work, they have derived the
set of optimal linear transforms for dimension reduction minimizing the probability of error in
communication. They have also stated that this optimal linear transformation can be used in
robust signal hashing problems.
In biometric hashing methods, a genuine user has a number of biometric data that is captured at
different enrollment and test sessions. This causes the genuine user to have a set of associated
biometric hash vectors. The different biometric data belonging to the same genuine user can be
seen as noisy versions of the same biometric data. Thus, this noise can be modeled as channel
noise between a transmitter and a receiver. In this work, we model the difference between the
biometric data of a legitimate user and his average biometric data as channel noise. In our
scenario, a regularized maximum likelihood estimate of the noise covariance which is shared
across users is the within-class covariance matrix defined as follows:
Σe ,
1
KL
K∑
i=1
L∑
j=1
(
xi, j − µi
) (
xi, j − µi
)T
+ αI, (3.1)
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where αI is added for regularization purposes, U∈ RP×P is the identity matrix and α is called the
regularization parameter. Furthermore,
µi ,
1
L
L∑
j=1
xi, j (3.2)
is the class centroid (the transmitted data in the communication scenario above), where xi, j
denotes the jth face feature vector of the ith user.
In this case, the set of projection matrices, T, which minimizes the probability of error can be
written as follows [88]:
T , UΣVT , (3.3)
where T∈ Rk×P is the projection matrix, k denotes the length of the final face hash vector f ∈
Rk×1, U∈ Rk×k is a random matrix whose elements are generated from the standard uniform
distribution on the open interval (0, 1) by using a Random Number Generator (RNG) with a
seed derived from the password and its columns are orthonormal, Σ ∈ Rk×kis a diagonal matrix
with pseudo-random positive diagonal entries which are generated from the standard uniform
distribution on the open interval (0, 1) by using the RNG with a seed derived from the password,
VT ∈ Rk×P is defined as follows:
V , RH, (3.4)
where H∈ Rk×k is a pseudo-random matrix whose elements are generated from the standard
uniform distribution on the open interval (0, 1) by using a RNG with a seed derived from the
password and its columns are orthonormal, R is a column matrix containing k eigenvectors,
which have the k smallest eigenvalues of Σe which has the following eigen-decomposition:
Σe , GZGT , (3.5)
where G is a column matrix containing the eigenvectors of Σe, Z is a diagonal matrix whose
diagonal elements are the corresponding eigen-values sorted from the highest magnitude to the
lowest. The matrix R consists of the k rightmost columns of the matrix G, the eigenvectors
corresponding to the lowest magnitude eigen-values.
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Thus, we can define the projection matrix T as follows:
T , UΣVT , UΣHT RT . (3.6)
Consequently, we will use this projection matrix which is partially generated in a random fashion
in order to generate the final hash vector. Intuitively, the matrix T seeks to project the data to a
lower dimensional subspace where the energy of the projected noise component is lowest.
At the next step, we project the training face images, Ii, j ∈ Rm×n, onto a lower k-dimensional
subspace as follows:
zi, j = Txi, j, (3.7)
where zi, j ∈ Rk×1 denotes the raw face image hash vector for jth face image of the ith user.
3.2.1.3 Quantization Phase
At this phase, we quantize the elements of the raw face hash vector zi, j ∈ Rk×1 in order to obtain
the intermediate hash vector qi, j ∈ Rk×1 of the training face image Ii, j. We employ min-max
method for performing the quantization [90]. This function maps the elements of the raw hash
vector to the interval [0, 1]. This new step brings extra unpredictability to our algorithm. The
quantization function is as follows;
qi, j (`) =
qi, j (`) −min(qi, j)
max(qi, j) −min(qi, j)
, (3.8)
where ` = 1, . . . , k and qi, j ∈ [0, 1]k×1, min(.) function computes the minimum value in its
input vector whereas max(.) function computes the maximum value in its input vector. Finally,
elements of the intermediate hash vector qi, j is rounded to 0 or 1 according to a threshold, which
is the mean value of the qi, j vector as follows:
fi, j (`) =
 1 if qi, j (`) ≥ µ,0 Otherwise, (3.9)
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where µ denotes the mean value of the elements of the vector qi, j and fi, j ∈ {0, 1}k×1 is the binary
hash vector for the training image Ii, j . Finally, we store all training face image hash vectors in
the database for verification purposes during the test stage.
3.2.2 Authentication Stage
At this stage, a claimer aims to gain access to the system via her biohash. For extracting binary
hash vectors, the same phases as in the enrollment stage are used in the test stage as well. The
authentication stage is illustrated in Figure 3.2.
3.2.2.1 Feature Extraction Phase
In the authentication stage, we first take a test face image, I˜i, j ∈ Rm×n (or the system captures a
face image of a claimer). Then, we use the same biometric feature extraction method used in the
enrollment stage. Recall that we have two cases in the enrollment stage. In case 1, we perform
DWT whereas we perform DWT followed by PCA in case 2 as addressed in the enrollment stage
section. Then, we apply the same procedures as in the enrollment stage in order to compute the
face image hash vector of the test image.
3.2.2.2 Optimal Linear Projection and Quantization Phases
In this part, we first reduce the dimensionality of the test face vector, x˜, by multiplying it with
the projection matrix, T, as follows:
z˜ = Tx˜, (3.10)
where x˜ ∈ Rk×1 denotes the raw face hash vector. Note that the random parts of T are randomly
generated using the secret key provided by the user. At the next step, we process the elements
of the raw face hash vector z˜ in order to obtain the intermediate hash vector q˜ ∈ [0, 1]k×1 of the
test image I˜ as we have discussed in the enrollment section. By making threshold operation to
the intermediate hash vector, we obtain the binary hash vector f ∈ [0, 1]k×1 for the test image .
For the verification decision, we calculate the Hamming distance between the hash vector of test
face image and the hash vectors of the training images belonging to the claimer and stored in
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of enrollment stage for the proposed face image hashing method based
on within-class covariance matrix
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the database. If Hamming distance is below the pre-determined distance threshold, the claimer
is accepted; otherwise, the user is rejected as show in Figure 3.2.
3.3 Simulation Results
In this section, we report our experimental results of the proposed face image hashing method
using the optimal linear transform. First, we demonstrate the performance of the proposed
method on Cambridge university AT&T face database [91]. There are 400 different face images
from 10 different images of each of 40 distinct subjects. The images were taken at different
times, varying the lighting, facial expressions and facial details. The size of the face images are
m = 112 and n = 92. Some sample images from AT&T face database are shown in Figure 3.3.
We have divided the database into two sets: training set and test set. The training set consists
of 5 images per user and the test set includes also 5 images per user. Secondly, we test the
performance of the proposed method on face images extracted from the Multi Modal Verification
for Teleservices and Security applications (M2VTS) face database [92, 93]. The face images in
this database are taken from the image frames of the video sequences as described in [93]. That
database consists of face images with various expressions, illumination conditions, angles, age,
sex, and glasses. The size of the face images are m = 48 and n = 64. There are 1480 face
images, which consist of 40 different face poses for 37 different people in the database. We
have divided the database into two sets: training set and test set. The training set consists of 20
images per user and the test set includes also 20 images per user.
We employ Hamming distance to measure the distance between the hash values of the face
images. By looking at all possible pairs, we test the performance of the system. In simulations,
we also set the regularization parameter α to 3 in Equation 3.1.
In the simulations with the AT&T database: for feature extraction method in case 1, we set
L = 2576 due to face image dimensions; for feature extraction in case 2, we set L=1024 since
we perform PCA after DWT. In the simulations with the M2VTS database: for feature extraction
method in case 1, we set L = 768 due to face image dimensions; for feature extraction in case
2, we again set L = 768 since we perform full PCA after DWT.
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Figure 3.3: A preview image of the AT&T face database.
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3.3.1 Experiments
In this sub-section, we study the performance of the proposed biometric hashing method using
standard verification metrics and compare it with the random projection based biometric hashing
methods proposed in the literature [2, 3].
Before implementing biometric hashing methods, we do not apply any pre-processing to the face
images in AT&T and M2VTS face image databases (i.e. alignment, illumination normalization,
rotation etc.).
Key-unknown Scenario: We assume that unauthorized users (attacker) have neither the secret
key (password or PIN) nor the biometric data (face image).
Key-stolen Scenario: We assume that unauthorized users (the attacker) steal the secret key
(password or PIN) and they can compute the person specific projection matrix T; however, they
do not have the biometric data of the claimed genuine person, so they use other biometric data
(face image of other users in the database)
In this scenario, we simulate the performance of the biometric hashing method in case an at-
tacker takes hold of the secret key of a legitimate user. Thus, we evaluate the actual performance
of the biometric hashing methods in this scenario since the secret key may be lost at any time.
Besides, the performance of the biometric hashing methods should not depend on the secrecy of
the user dependent key [17]. Otherwise, if the key can be kept as a secret, we would not need
biometrics at all.
The simulation results of the key-unknown scenario are given in Table 3.1-Table 3.4 in terms of
equal error rate (EER). The error rates are mostly zero since the randomization of the projections
enables perfect separation of genuine and impostor users. In other words, since the user-defined
secret key is not acquired by the attacker, we achieve perfect separation between genuine and
imposter pairs. The simulation results of the key-stolen scenario are given in Table 3.5-Table
3.8 in terms of EER. It is clearly seen that the introduced method is superior to the method in
[2, 3] since we make use of the noise subspace properties in an intelligent manner.
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3.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a new face image hashing method based on optimal linear
transformation defined for a noisy communication channel between transmitter and receiver
[88]. We model the variations between the face images belonging to the same user as channel
noise. In our case, the maximum likelihood estimate of the noise covariance is the within-class
covariance matrix. We evaluate the performance of the biometric verification system based
on the proposed face image hashing method on AT&T and M2VTS face databases with two
different use-case scenarios. The simulation results show that the proposed biometric hashing
method has much better performance in comparison to the random projection based biometric
hashing methods in the literature [2, 3]. Furthermore, in general, performance of the proposed
method increases with the increasing length of the biometric hash vector. Finally, the proposed
method can also be applied to other biometrics such as fingerprint and iris.
Table 3.1: The EERs of the proposed face image hashing method and Ngo et al.s method
[2, 3] for key-unknown scenario with feature extraction method in case 1 (DWT only) and with
AT&T face database
Length EER (%) of
the Proposed
Method
EER (%) of EER of
Ngo et al.s Method
[2, 3]
Scenario Method Database
64 bit % 0.00 % 0.00 Key-
unknown
Case 1
(DWT only)
AT&T
128 bit % 0.00 % 0.00 Key-
unknown
Case 1
(DWT only)
AT&T
256 bit % 0.00 % 0.00 Key-
unknown
Case 1
(DWT only)
AT&T
512 bit % 0.00 % 0.00 Key-
unknown
Case 1
(DWT only)
AT&T
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Table 3.2: The EERs of the proposed face image hashing method and Ngo et al.s method [2, 3]
for key-unknown scenario with feature extraction method in case 2 (DWT plus PCA) and with
AT&T face database
Length EER (%) of
the Proposed
Method
EER (%) of EER of
Ngo et al.s Method
[2, 3]
Scenario Method Database
64 bit % 0.05 % 0.04 Key-
unknown
Case 2
(DWT plus
PCA)
AT&T
128 bit % 0.02 % 0.00 Key-
unknown
Case 2
(DWT plus
PCA)
AT&T
256 bit % 0.00 % 0.00 Key-
unknown
Case 2
(DWT plus
PCA)
AT&T
512 bit % 0.00 % 0.00 Key-
unknown
Case 2
(DWT plus
PCA)
AT&T
Table 3.3: The EERs of the proposed face image hashing method and Ngo et al.s method
[2, 3] for key-unknown scenario with feature extraction method in case 1 (DWT only) and with
M2VTS face database
Length EER (%) of
the Proposed
Method
EER (%) of EER of
Ngo et al.s Method
[2, 3]
Scenario Method Database
64 bit % 0.00 % 0.00 Key-
unknown
Case 1
(DWT only)
M2VTS
128 bit % 0.00 % 0.00 Key-
unknown
Case 1
(DWT only)
M2VTS
256 bit % 0.00 % 0.00 Key-
unknown
Case 1
(DWT only)
M2VTS
512 bit % 0.00 % 0.00 Key-
unknown
Case 1
(DWT only)
M2VTS
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Table 3.4: The EERs of the proposed face image hashing method and Ngo et al.s method [2, 3]
for key-unknown scenario with feature extraction method in case 2 (DWT plus PCA) and with
M2VTS face database
Length EER (%) of
the Proposed
Method
EER (%) of EER of
Teoh et al.s Method
[2, 3]
Scenario Method Database
64 bit % 15.36 % 17.88 Key-
unknown
Case 2
(DWT plus
PCA)
M2VTS
128 bit % 09.03 % 13.18 Key-
unknown
Case 2
(DWT plus
PCA)
M2VTS
256 bit % 06.39 % 10.22 Key-
unknown
Case 2
(DWT plus
PCA)
M2VTS
512 bit % 04.43 % 08.64 Key-
unknown
Case 2
(DWT plus
PCA)
M2VTS
Table 3.5: The EERs of the proposed face image hashing method and Ngo et al.s method [2, 3]
for key-stolen scenario with feature extraction method in case 1 (DWT only) and with AT&T
face database
Length EER (%) of
the Proposed
Method
EER (%) of EER of
Ngo et al.s Method
[2, 3]
Scenario Method Database
64 bit % 5.91 % 32.05 Key-stolen Case 1
(DWT only)
AT&T
128 bit % 12.86 % 28.15 Key-stolen Case 1
(DWT only)
AT&T
256 bit % 12.58 % 23.47 Key-stolen Case 1
(DWT only)
AT&T
512 bit % 18.23 % 20.84 Key-stolen Case 1
(DWT only)
AT&T
Optimal Linear Transform Based Biohashing 37
Table 3.6: The EERs of the proposed face image hashing method and Ngo et al.s method [2, 3]
for key-stolen scenario with feature extraction method in case 2 (DWT plus PCA) and with
AT&T face database
Length EER (%) of
the Proposed
Method
EER (%) of EER of
Ngo et al.s Method
[2, 3]
Scenario Method Database
64 bit % 13.98 % 32.05 Key-stolen Case 2
(DWT plus
PCA)
AT&T
128 bit % 13.45 % 28.15 Key-stolen Case 2
(DWT plus
PCA)
AT&T
256 bit % 13.29 % 23.47 Key-stolen Case 2
(DWT plus
PCA)
AT&T
512 bit % 15.85 % 20.84 Key-stolen Case 2
(DWT plus
PCA)
AT&T
Table 3.7: The EERs of the proposed face image hashing method and Ngo et al.s method [2, 3]
for key-stolen scenario with feature extraction method in case 1 (DWT only) and with M2VTS
face database
Length EER (%) of
the Proposed
Method
EER (%) of EER of
Ngo et al.s Method
[2, 3]
Scenario Method Database
64 bit % 13.52 % 36.90 Key-stolen Case 1
(DWT only)
M2VTS
128 bit % 27.86 % 35.15 Key-stolen Case 1
(DWT only)
M2VTS
256 bit % 23.43 % 25.93 Key-stolen Case 1
(DWT only)
M2VTS
512 bit % 37.15 % 25.79 Key-stolen Case 1
(DWT only)
M2VTS
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Table 3.8: The EERs of the proposed face image hashing method and Ngo et al.s method [2, 3]
for key-stolen scenario with feature extraction method in case 2 (DWT plus PCA) and with
M2VTS face database
Length EER (%) of
the Proposed
Method
EER (%) of EER of
Ngo et al.s Method
[2, 3]
Scenario Method Database
64 bit % 17.75 % 21.14 Key-stolen Case 2
(DWT plus
PCA)
M2VTS
128 bit % 11.22 % 18.33 Key-stolen Case 2
(DWT plus
PCA)
M2VTS
256 bit % 09.84 % 16.59 Key-stolen Case 2
(DWT plus
PCA)
M2VTS
512 bit % 07.64 % 16.13 Key-stolen Case 2
(DWT plus
PCA)
M2VTS
Chapter 4
Discriminative Projection Selection
Based Face Image Hashing
4.1 Introduction
1 In this chapter, we propose a new face image hashing method based on a proposed technique
that we call “discriminative projection selection” to reduce verification errors [26]. This tech-
nique selects the rows of the random projection matrix used in biometric hashing matrix, which
is a user dependent dimension reduction matrix, by using the Fisher criterion [27]. Moreover,
we employ Gaussian mixture model at the quantization step to obtain more distinct face image
hash vectors for each user.
4.2 The Proposed Biometric Verification Method
In this section, we introduce a biometric verification system which employs the proposed face
image hashing method based on the discriminative projection selection technique. In the pro-
posed biometric verification method, there are two main stages:
1. Enrollment stage,
2. Authentication stage.
1This chapter is based on [26].
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Figure 4.1: Basic steps of the biometric hashing methods
These stages are addressed in the below parts.
4.2.1 Enrollment Stage
There are three main steps at the enrollment stage:
1. Feature extraction,
2. Dimension reduction,
3. Quantization.
4.2.1.1 Feature Extraction
At the feature extraction phase, we use two sets of data: training set and “others” set. The
training set has training face images of registered users, Ii, j ∈ Rm×n, i = 1, . . . ,K where K
denotes number of users and j = 1, . . . , L where L denotes number of training images per
user. We lexicographically re-order them and obtain training face vectors, xi, j ∈ R(mn)×1. The
others set contains randomly selected face images which do not belong to any registered users
I˜s ∈ Rm×n, s = 1, . . . ,M where M denotes the number of face images belonging to the others
set. We again lexicographically re-order them and obtain face vectors, x˜s ∈ R(mn)×1 of the others
set. We apply PCA to the face images in the training set for feature extraction.
yi, j = A(xi, j − µ), (4.1)
Discriminative Biohashing 41
where A ∈ Rq×(mn) is the PCA matrix trained using the face images in the training set, yi, j ∈ Rq×1
is the PCA coefficient vector belonging to the jth training image of the ith user and µ is the mean
face vector. We project the face images in the others set onto the PCA subspace as follows:
y˜ s = A(x˜s − µ), (4.2)
where y˜ s ∈ Rq×1 is the PCA coefficient vector belonging to the sth image of the others set. We
use these PCA coefficient vectors in the discriminative projection selection technique to find the
most valuable features, which maximize the distance between the face images of a user in the
training set and the face images in the others set, in the lower-dimensional subspace.
4.2.1.2 Dimension Reduction
At the dimension reduction phase, we first generate a random projection (RP) matrix, Ti ∈
R`×q, for each user to reduce the dimension of her feature vector. The RP matrix elements
are identically and independently distributed (i.i.d) and generated from a Gaussian distribution
with zero mean and unit variance by using a random number generator (RNG) with a seed
derived from the user’s secret key. We apply the Gram-Schmidt (GS) procedure to obtain an
orthonormal projection matrix Ri ∈ R`×q to have more distinct projections. Then, we project the
PCA coefficient vectors of the ith user onto a lower `-dimensional subspace.
zi, j = Riyi, j, (4.3)
where zi, j ∈ R`×1 is the intermediate face image hash vector belonging to the jth training image
of the ith user.
To determine the competing hash vectors, we also project the others set using the RP matrix as
follows:
z˜ s = Riy˜s, (4.4)
where z˜s ∈ R`×1 is the intermediate face image hash vector of the sth face image of the others
set and Ri is the orthonormal random projection matrix of the ith user.
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The proposed discriminative projection selection technique selects the rows of the matrix Ri
using the Fisher criterion [27] and creates the discriminative random projections. Thus, we aim
to increase discriminability due to mapping the PCA coefficient vectors into a more discriminant
subspace. Fisher criterion is a feature selection method and in this case the features are obtained
after the random projection of a PCA coefficient vector y, namely:
z(k) = rTi,ky, (4.5)
for k = 1, . . . , `, where z(k) is a scalar value and rTi,k ∈ R1×q denotes the kth row of Ri. The
kth feature for the ith user’s jth image is zi, j(k) and the same feature for the sth element of the
others set is z˜s(k) which are the kth elements of the corresponding vectors defined in Equations
(4.3) and (4.4). The features are already uncorrelated due to the GS procedure which ensures
rTi,kri,m = 0 for k , m.
We define
eki ,
[
zi,1 (k) , . . . , zi,L (k)
]
, (4.6)
which is a collection of the kth dimension (or bit position) coefficients of the intermediate hash
vectors belonging to the ith user for each k = 1, . . . , `.
First, we compute the sample mean value, µˆ1,ki , of each e
k
i vector for each bit position k = 1, . . . , `
as follows:
µˆ1,ki =
1
L
L∑
j=1
eki ( j) , (4.7)
where eki ( j) is the j
th element of the vector eki which is defined in Equation (4.6).
Then, we compute the sample standard deviation, σˆ1,ki , of each e
k
i vector for each bit position
k = 1, . . . , ` as follows:
σˆ1,ki =
 1L
L∑
j=1
(
eki ( j) − µˆ1,ki
)2
1
2
. (4.8)
Similarly, we collect together the kth dimension values of the intermediate hash vectors of the
“others” data set as follows:
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qk , [z˜1 (k) , . . . , z˜M (k)] , (4.9)
for all k = 1, . . . , `.
First, we compute the sample mean value, µˆ2,ki , of each q
k for each bit position k = 1, . . . , ` as
follows:
µˆ2,ki =
1
M
M∑
s=1
qk (s) , (4.10)
where qk (s) is the sth element of the vector qk which is defined in Equation (4.9).
Next, we compute the sample standard deviation, σˆ2,ki , of each q
k for each bit position k =
1, . . . , ` as follows:
σˆ2,ki =
 1M
M∑
s=1
(
qk (s) − µˆ2,k
)2
1
2
. (4.11)
By applying the Fisher criterion, we try to select the rows that have higher contrast between
genuine user’s data and the others set. In other words, we aim to reduce the distance between
the genuine user’s different face image hash vectors while at the same time we aim to maximize
the distance between the ith user’s data and the others set. We compute the Fisher score for each
row of Ri as follows:
ηi (k) =
∣∣∣µˆ1,ki − µˆ2,ki ∣∣∣2(
σˆ1,ki
)2
+
(
σˆ2,ki
)2 . (4.12)
We use these Fisher scores obtained for each dimension k to rank the rows of the random pro-
jection matrix Ri. We define rTi,k to be the k
th row of Ri. That is
Ri =

rTi,1
...
rTi,`
 . (4.13)
We choose top ranking rows from the random projection matrix. Let ci be the index vector
which ranks the rows of the matrix in a descending manner from 1 to w where w is the number
of desired rows. That is, ci(1) is the row index of Ri that has the highest Fisher score, ci(2) is
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the index with the second highest score and so on. Thus, we obtain the discriminative random
projection matrix Rˆi ∈ Rw×q and the index vector, ci, which contains the indices of top w rows
for each user. We define
Rˆi =

rˆTi,1
...
rˆTi,w
 , (4.14)
where rˆi,p = ri,ci(p) for p = 1, . . . , w. We only store the index vector, ci, for the ith user in the
database for verification at the test stage.
Next, we project the PCA coefficients, which belong to the training face images of the ith user,
onto a lower w-dimensional subspace by using the calculated Rˆi as follows:
f i, j = Rˆiyi, j, (4.15)
where f i, j ∈ Rw×1 is the raw face image hash vector belonging to the jth training image of the ith
user.
Ngo et.al [2, 3] uses FLD as a feature extraction method which is applied before the random
projection step in the algorithm. Their FLD transform is not user specific and aims to discrimi-
nate face images belonging to different users in the database. In our case, we employ the Fisher
criterion for projection selection for biometric verification. Therefore, in our case, the projection
selection is user-specific and aims to discriminate the claimed user’s biometric hash vector from
all other possible ones that may come from other face images. In our case, other face images
may even be from outside the database which is more realistic in a real scenario. Our others
set is chosen from another database for this purpose. The projection selection is done after the
random projection step. FLD can reduce dimension at most to K − 1 dimensions, where K is
the number of users in the database, due to the maximal rank of the between class covariance
matrix. However, in our method, we do not have such a limitation since the selection is done by
ranking the Fisher criteria obtained from each projection. In summary, there are fundamental
differences between using FLD as a dimension reducing feature extraction method and using the
Fisher criteria for selection of random projections that best separate the claimed identity from
all others.
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4.2.2 Quantization
In this subsection, we discuss the quantization methods used in this work. We employ two
different quantization methods: (1) Binary quantization (BQ) [2, 3] and (2) The proposed Gaus-
sian mixture model (GMM) based quantization method. In our simulations, we employ these
quantization methods separately to show the performance of the system.
4.2.2.1 Binary Quantization Method with a Fixed Threshold
This technique is employed in Ngo et al.’s method [2, 3]. The raw face image hash vector f i, j
elements are binarized with respect to a fixed threshold as follows:
λi, j (k) =
 1 if f i, j (k) ≥ µ˜,0 Otherwise, (4.16)
where the threshold µ˜ is chosen as the sample mean value of elements of the vector f i, j and
k = 1, . . . , w. The computed reference face image hash vectors λi, j ∈ Rw×1 are stored in the
database.
4.2.2.2 The Proposed GMM Based Quantization Method
To the best of our knowledge, there is no face image hashing method employing GMM in the
quantization step. GMM is one of the most widely used data clustering methods in the literature
[94]. Let us assume that we have a set of numbers which are obtained by collecting the kth
elements of raw face image hash vectors and we want to binarize the element of this set. Since
our aim is to make binarization, we fit two Gaussian distributions to the histogram of the kth
elements of the raw face image hash vectors by using the GMM. Then, we choose the average
of the mean values of these two Gaussian distributions as a meaningful threshold for partition of
these two distributions. We repeat it for each bit location k = 1, . . . , w separately. In other words,
we employ bimodal GMM to find a threshold for each bit position for binarization. Let fi, j (k)
denote the kth bit of f i, j ∈ Rw×1, we define the vector dk as the collection of all kth dimension
values of the raw image hashes in the database.
dk ,
[
f i, j (k) : i = 1, . . . ,K, j = 1, . . . , L
]
∈ Rr×1, (4.17)
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where k = 1, . . . , w, r = K × L, K is the number of users and L is the number of training images
per user. Assume that the elements of the vector dk are observations of a single random variable
d.
p
(
d | Ψk
)
=
S∑
s=1
αks p
(
d | θks
)
, (4.18)
where αks is a mixture weight,
∑S
s=1 α
k
s = 1 where S = 2 due to binarization, Ψ
k =
{
αk1, α
k
2, θ
k
1, θ
k
2
}
and p
(
d | Ψk
)
is a one-dimensional Gaussian density with its own parameters θks =
{
µks, σ
k
s
}
as
follows:
p
(
d | θks
)
=
1
σks
√
2pi
e
−(d−µks)2/
(
2(σks)
2
)
, (4.19)
where µks and σ
k
s denote the mean and the standard deviation for the s
th component of the GMM
respectively for s = {1, 2}. We find a threshold for each bit position as follows:
Tk =
µk1 + µ
k
2
2
, (4.20)
where Tk denotes the threshold for the kth bit position of the raw face image hash vector f i, j,
∀i, j. Note that, the GMM is trained using the whole training set for each bit position. Thus, the
GMM parameters are not user dependent. Finally, the elements of f i, j are binarized with respect
to the system-level thresholds as follows:
λi, j (k) =
 1 if f i, j (k) ≥ Tk,0 Otherwise, (4.21)
where k = 1, . . . , w. The computed reference face image hash vectors λi, j ∈ Rwx1 are stored in
the database.
4.2.3 Authentication Stage
At the authentication stage, a claimer claims that she is the ith user and sends her face image and
her secret key to the system. The system computes her test face image hash vector by using her
face image, her secret key (to generate a RP matrix) and the index vector, ci, which belongs to
the ith user. Recall that index vectors and the reference face image hash vectors of the registered
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users are stored in the database; however, the secret keys are not stored in the database. Then, the
Hamming distance [95] is computed between the test face image hash vector and the reference
face image hash vectors which belong to the ith user and were generated at the enrollment stage.
If it is below the pre-determined distance threshold, the claimer is accepted; otherwise, the
claimer is rejected.
We simulate two scenarios in our experiments. These scenarios are described in detail below.
1. Key-unknown Scenario: In this scenario, an unauthorized impostor has neither the secret
key nor the face image template belonging to the genuine user. Note that the index vectors
of the users are stored in the database. Therefore, whenever a claimer claims that she is
the ith user and sends her face image and a secret key to the system, the system computes
a test face image hash vector by using the data sent by the claimer and the index vector,
ci, which belongs to the ith user.
2. Key-stolen Scenario: In this scenario, an unauthorized impostor acquires the secret key of
the ith genuine user but does not have the claimed person’s face image. When an impostor
sends her face image and the secret key of the ith user to the system, the system computes
a test face image hash vector by using the data sent by the impostor and the index vector
ci that belongs to the ith user which is stored in the database.
4.3 Simulation Results
In this section, we discuss our experimental results. We test the performance of the proposed
method on AT&T [91], AR [96] and Sheffield (previously UMIST) face databases [97]. The
AT&T database has 400 different face images corresponding to 40 distinct people. The AR
database has 3120 face images belonging to 120 different people’s faces with different facial ex-
pressions, illumination conditions, and occlusions (sun glasses and scarf). Some sample images
from the AR face database are shown in Figure 4.2. The Sheffield database has 564 differ-
ent face images belonging to 20 different people. Some sample images from the Sheffield face
database are shown in Figure 4.3. Besides, we randomly select 104 face images from Carnegie
Mellon University database [98] and create the others set. Some sample images from the CMU
face database are shown in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.2: A preview image of the AR face database.
Figure 4.3: A preview image of the Sheffield face database.
Figure 4.4: A preview image of the CMU face database.
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We compare the performance of the proposed method to Ngo et al.’s PCA+RP and FLD+RP
methods that were introduced in [2, 3] as shown in Table 4.2. We automatically select face im-
ages for training and test sets and evaluate the performance of the proposed method and Ngo et
al.’s methods [2, 3]. We use 1024-length PCA coefficient vectors for the face images belonging
to the training, test and others sets in the simulations. In our experiments, pre-processing tech-
niques such as eye alignment, head region masking, lighting adjustment are not applied to the
face images. In our simulations for both scenarios; for impostor tests, each face image of each
user in the test set is compared against each face image of all other users in the training set. A
successful impostor attempt results in a false acceptance error. For the genuine tests, each face
image of each user in the test set is compared against all face images of the same user in the
training set. A failed genuine attempt results in a false rejection error. The detailed information
on the data sets used in the experiments are given in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Datasets and experimental set-up
Database Number of Face Images Train set Test set
AR 3120 images from 120
people
The first 7 images of each
user
The last 2 images
of each user
AT&T 400 images from 40 peo-
ple
The first 5 images of each
user
The remaining 5
images of each user
Sheffield 564 images from 20 peo-
ple
The first 8 images of each
user
The following 8
images of each
user
The proposed method has better performance in terms of equal error rate (EER) in comparison
to Ngo et al.’s methods [2, 3] whereas Ngo et al.’s PCA+RP and FLD+RP methods have com-
parable performances with each other as shown in Table 4.2. As the length of face image hash
vector decreases, the proposed method shows better improvement since the proposed dimension
reduction matrix better preserves the pair-wise distances between feature vectors in the reduced
dimension subspace in comparison with the traditional random projection matrix. The best re-
sults are usually obtained with 128 or 256 bits. Besides, we plot the detection error trade-off
(DET) curves [35] for key-stolen scenario of the 256 bit face image hash length with the AT&T
database in Figure 4.5.
In chapter 3, we obtain zero EERs in the key-unknown scenario whereas very high EERs in the
key-stolen scenario with the optimal linear transform based biohashing method. However, we
focus to reduce the EER in the key-stolen scenario in this chapter and that’s why we use only
PCA for feature extraction. In addition, we do not work for finding better feature extraction
methods in this thesis. It is obvious that the biohashing methods can perform better with better
Discriminative Biohashing 50
Table 4.2: EER performances of the proposed face image hashing method and Ngo et al.’s
methods [2, 3]
Length EER (%) of
Ngo et al.’s
method
[2, 3]
(PCA+RP)
EER (%) of
Ngo et al.’s
method
[2, 3]
(FLD+RP)
EER (%) of
the proposed
method
with binary
quantization
method
EER (%) of
the proposed
method with
GMM based
quantization
method
Scenario Database
64 bit % 12.19 % 10.46 % 3.83 % 2.73 Key-
unknown
AT&T
128 bit % 7.36 % 8.51 % 2.23 % 1.57 Key-
unknown
AT&T
256 bit % 5.81 % 5.50 % 1.80 % 1.15 Key-
unknown
AT&T
512 bit % 3.79 % 4.17 % 2.48 % 2.10 Key-
unknown
AT&T
64 bit % 16.93 % 18.13 % 14.40 % 13.58 Key-stolen AT&T
128 bit % 13.97 % 16.73 % 12.01 % 11.14 Key-stolen AT&T
256 bit % 12.76 % 14.50 % 10.80 % 10.23 Key-stolen AT&T
512 bit % 12.34 % 13.55 % 10.15 % 9.73 Key-stolen AT&T
64 bit % 23.63 % 23.34 % 9.08 % 8.96 Key-
unknown
AR
128 bit % 18.24 % 18.05 % 8.67 % 8.72 Key-
unknown
AR
256 bit % 15.82 % 13.93 % 7.81 % 8.12 Key-
unknown
AR
512 bit % 11.38 % 11.92 % 8.33 % 8.57 Key-
unknown
AR
64 bit % 28.27 % 28.51 % 18.07 % 18.46 Key-stolen AR
128 bit % 27.17 % 27.56 % 18.06 % 18.05 Key-stolen AR
256 bit % 25.50 % 26.44 % 19.10 % 18.83 Key-stolen AR
512 bit % 24.89 % 25.04 % 20.95 % 20.41 Key-stolen AR
64 bit % 17.09 % 22.00 % 15.75 % 16.23 Key-
unknown
Sheffield
128 bit % 16.38 % 19.10 % 13.33 % 14.03 Key-
unknown
Sheffield
256 bit % 15.05 % 14.93 % 11.45 % 11.05 Key-
unknown
Sheffield
512 bit % 14.97 % 14.12 % 10.44 % 12.20 Key-
unknown
Sheffield
64 bit % 21.40 % 24.50 % 19.38 % 20.68 Key-stolen Sheffield
128 bit % 21.92 % 24.30 % 17.51 % 19.71 Key-stolen Sheffield
256 bit % 22.53 % 22.02 % 16.96 % 17.80 Key-stolen Sheffield
512 bit % 23.47 % 22.55 % 19.27 % 18.22 Key-stolen Sheffield
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feature extraction methods. Instead, we try to improve the performance of the random projection
based biohashing methods by proposing better dimension reduction methods and/or quantization
methods since these phases cause verification errors due to large information loss at these phases.
Ngo et al. [2, 3] employ binary quantization method with a fixed threshold for all bits. This
method may be suboptimal in some cases. The proposed GMM-based quantization method
reduces EER most of the time in comparison to the binary quantization since it finds more
meaningful threshold values for each bit position.
4.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we propose a novel biohashing method for a biometric verification system. The
proposed method is based on discriminative projection selection depending on Fisher criteria.
Another novelty of the proposed method is to employ bimodal GMM in the quantization. The
simulations show that it has better performance in comparison with the random projection based
biohashing methods proposed in the literature.
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Figure 4.5: DET plots for the methods with 256 bit face image hash vector length for key-stolen
scenario - AT&T database
Chapter 5
Error-Correcting Output Codes
Guided Quantization For Biometric
Hashing
5.1 Introduction
1 In this chapter, we propose a novel biometric hashing scheme which depends on Error-Correcting
Output Codes (ECOC) [28]. We improve the performance of the random projection based bio-
metric hashing scheme by introducing a new quantization method that attempts to optimize
biometric hash vectors by using the ideas from ECOC classifiers. The proposed scheme shows
superior performance in comparison with Ngo et al.’s scheme [2] on four databases.
5.2 The Proposed Biometric Verification System
In this section, we introduce our new biometric verification system based on the proposed ECOC
guided biometric hash generation method. In the proposed biometric verification method, there
are two main stages:
1. Enrollment stage,
1This chapter is based on [28].
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Figure 5.1: The basic steps of the proposed biometric hashing scheme
2. Authentication stage.
These stages are addressed in the following sections.
5.2.1 Enrollment Stage
In this part, we explain the enrollment stage which consists of three main phases:
1. Feature extraction,
2. Dimension reduction,
3. ECOC guided biometric hash generation.
5.2.1.1 Feature Extraction
At this phase, we use face images in the training set. The training set has training face images
belonging to registered users, Ii, j ∈ Rm×n where i = 1, 2, . . . ,K and K denotes the number of
users, j = 1, 2, . . . , L and L denotes the number of training images per user. We lexicographically
re-order the face images and obtain training face vectors, xi, j ∈ R(mn)×1. Then, we employ
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Principle Component Analysis (PCA) to the face images in the training set for feature extraction
as follows:
yi, j = A(xi, j − µ), (5.1)
where A ∈ Rk×(mn) is the PCA matrix trained by the face images in the training set, µ is the mean
face vector and yi, j ∈ Rk×1 is a vector containing PCA coefficients belonging to the jth training
image of the ith user.
5.2.1.2 Dimension Reduction
We generate a Random Projection (RP) matrix, Ri ∈ R`×k ∀i, for each user to reduce the di-
mension of the face images in the training set. The RP matrix elements are identically and
independently (i.i.d) generated from a Gauss distribution with zero mean and unit variance by
using a Random Number Generator (RNG) with a seed derived from the user’s secret key. We
apply Gram-Schmidt (GS) procedure to obtain an orthonormal projection matrix RGS ,i ∈ R`×k
from Ri to have more distinct projections. We project the PCA coefficient vectors onto a lower
`-dimensional subspace as follows:
zi, j = RGS ,iyi, j, (5.2)
where zi, j ∈ R`×1 is an intermediate biometric hash vector belonging to the jth training image of
the ith user.
5.2.1.3 ECOC Guided Biometric Hash Generation
At this phase, we first calculate a representative intermediate biometric hash vector, Ei, for each
user:
Ei (m) =
1
L
L∑
j=1
zi, j (m) , (5.3)
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where m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , `} and ` is the length of the raw biometric hash vector. Next, we map
the elements of Ei to the interval [0, 1] by employing min-max normalization [99] and obtain a
representative raw biometric hash vector, Vi ∈ R`×1, for each user as follows:
Vi (m) =
Ei (m) −min (Ei)
max (Ei) −min (Ei) , (5.4)
where Vi denotes a representative raw biometric hash vector of the ith user, min(.) function
computes minimum value of its input vector and max(.) function computes maximum value of
its input vector.
Conventionally, the Vi vector is binary-quantized by thresholding to obtain the final biometric
hash vector for each user. In Ngo et al.’s scheme [2], a different quantization threshold (tg)
for each user is obtained by computing the average value of each associated vector, that is
tg = 1/`
∑`
m=1 Vi(m). Note that the threshold is the same for each bit position, therefore we can
call it a global threshold.
In contrast, we employ bit-adaptive quantization to improve the performance of the biometric
hashing scheme by generating a more diverse set of biometric hashes for authorized users. We
define C as the codeword matrix which is formed by stacking biometric hashes of all users in its
rows. The ith row of C is obtained by performing quantization on Vi using a set of thresholds
(one for each bit) which we aim to optimize.
C (i,m) =
 1 if Vi (m) ≥ t (m) ,0 Otherwise. (5.5)
In the literature, ECOC is proposed to cope with multi-class classification problems using mul-
tiple binary classifiers [100, 101]. Here, our aim is to reduce verification errors by employing
separation criteria used in ECOC classifiers to optimize the biometric hash codeword matrix C
by modifying the threshold vector t.
The ECOC matrices are optimized on two main criteria [102]: 1) Row separation, 2) Column
separation. In the proposed method, we use row and column separation criteria described below
to optimize the biometric hash vectors.
Row Separation: The Hamming distance between the biometric hash vectors, which belong
to different users, should be maximized to reduce errors. The minimum Hamming distance
between any pair of biometric hash vectors is called the row separation:
Error-Correcting Output Codes Guided Quantization For Biometric Hashing 56
Hr(t) = min
i, j,i, j
∑`
m=1
|C(i,m) −C( j,m)|. (5.6)
Hr is dependent on t since the thresholds determine and change the codeword matrix C. An
ECOC matrix with minimum Hamming distance, Hr, between any pair of biometric hash vectors
will correct up to
⌊
Hr−1
2
⌋
bit errors [10]. Thus, it is beneficial to maximize this minimum distance
to obtain better biometric hash vectors.
Column Separation: Column separation is defined as the minimum Hamming distance between
all the columns of the codeword matrix C. The aim in ECOC matrix design is to maximize the
column separation. In calculating the column separation we should also consider the distance
to the complement of a column as well since it gives the same split of the set of biometric hash
bits.
Hc(t) = min
m,n,m,n
 K∑
i=1
|C(i,m) −C(i, n)| ,
K∑
i=1
|1 −C(i,m) −C(i, n)|
 , (5.7)
where m, n ∈ {1, . . . , `} and K denotes the number of users. Maximizing the column sepa-
ration will increase the verification accuracy of the system by decreasing correlation between
classification errors [101, 102] and makes the system more robust against attacks. We define
H(t) = Hr(t) + Hc(t) as the optimization criterion to maximize. Hence, we have to solve
tˆ = arg max
t
H(t).
Since the user cannot give exactly the same biometric template for each attempt to enter the
system due to sensor imperfections and/or inherent user dependent variability, errors occur in
biometric hashes. To decrease such errors, Hamming distance between the biometric hash vec-
tors belonging to different users should be maximized. Besides, Hamming distance between
each bit position of the biometric hash vectors should be maximized to reduce redundancy and
to increase security against attacks.
We proceed as follows to optimize this complex objective. Initially, we find an optimum system
level quantization threshold tˆs ∈ [0, 1] that maximizes H(ts) = Hr(ts) + Hc(ts) by using the
Golden section search (GSS) algorithm [103] in the range [0, 1]. The optimum system level
threshold, tˆs = arg max
ts
(H(ts)), is a quantization threshold which can be used for all bit positions
of the biometric hash vectors.
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Next, using the optimal system level threshold as an initial value, we find an optimum threshold
for each bit position (m) of the biometric hash vectors that maximizes H(t) = Hr(t) + Hc(t)
by using the Golden section search algorithm [103] within the range [0, 1]. We perform this by
using the coordinate descent method where we update one coordinate at a time while keeping the
rest of the threshold vector constant. So, at each iteration, we solve optimization problem tˆ(m) =
arg max
t(m)
(
H( t˜)
)
for m = 1, . . . , ` where t˜ ∈ R1×` is the latest threshold vector which contains the
latest values of the thresholds for all bit positions and tˆ(m) ∈ [0, 1] is the optimum threshold
value for mth bit position of the biometric hash vector. We go through all the coordinates multiple
times until the iterations stop changing the objective value H(t). The vector obtained in the end
is the optimal bit-adaptive threshold vector tˆ.
The pseudo-code of the optimization algorithm performed in the enrollment phase is given as
Algorithm 1.
5.2.1.4 Relation with ECOC classification
In our scheme, we employ the column and row separation criteria used in ECOC matrix design
to optimize the codeword matrix obtained from the biometric hash vectors. So, we do not
pre-specify the codeword matrix and design classifiers afterward as regularly done in ECOC
classification. Random projection followed by binary quantization that is used in biometric
hashing can be seen as using a set of random linear classifiers wT x−b ≷ 0 where w corresponds
to a single row of the random projection matrix and the bias term b corresponds to the bit-
specific threshold t. Our method can be seen as using a number of random linear classifiers and
modifying their bias value (the threshold) to optimize the row and column separation obtained
by them. So, our method is not a direct application of ECOC multi-class classification, rather
an innovative idea where random linear classifiers are optimized in their bias terms to obtain a
better codeword matrix that will result in better verification performance.
5.2.2 Authentication Stage
At this stage, a claimer sends his face image I˜ ∈ Rm×n and his secret key to the system. Then,
the system computes the claimer’s test biometric hash vector by using the same procedures in
the enrollment phase with the optimum threshold for each bit position, t(m). Finally, the system
computes the Hamming distance [95] between the test biometric hash vector and the claimed
Error-Correcting Output Codes Guided Quantization For Biometric Hashing 58
Algorithm 1 Pseudo Code of the Enrollment Phase
1: K : number of users and L : number of face images per user
2: ` : Length of biometric hash vector
3: Inputs: Training face images, Ii, j, and secret keys of the users
4: Outputs: The binary codeword matrix, C, and threshold vector t
5: Compute PCA matrix A by using all the training images Ii, j
6: for i← 1 to K do
6: Generate RP matrix RGS ,i by using the secret key of the ith user
7: for j← 1 to L do
7: Compute PCA coefficient vectors xi, j
7: Compute yi, j = A(xi, j − µ)
7: Compute zi, j = RGS ,iyi, j
8: end for
9: end for
10: for i← 1 to K do
11: for m← 1 to ` do
11: Compute Ei (m) = 1L
∑L
j=1 zi, j (m)
12: end for
13: end for
14: for i← 1 to K do
15: for m← 1 to ` do
15: Compute Vi (m) = Ei(m)−min(Ei)max(Ei)−min(Ei)
16: end for
17: end for
18: t0s ← 0.5 (set initial value of quantization threshold)
19: Solve tˆs = arg max
ts
Hr(ts) + Hc(ts) using GSS algorithm
20: t0(m) = tˆs,m = 1, . . . , ` (set initial value of the threshold vector to the system level thresh-
old)
21: Solve tˆ = arg max
t
Hr(t) + Hc(t) using coordinate descent and GSS algorithm for each coor-
dinate
21: Compute codeword matrix C by using the optimal threshold vector tˆ
21: Store binary codeword matrix C and the threshold vector tˆ
user’s reference biometric hash vector stored in the database. If the Hamming distance is below
the pre-determined distance threshold, the claimer is accepted; otherwise, the claimer is rejected.
Since the biometric hash vectors can only be computed by the system, a user typically does not
know her biometric hash vector. Whenever a new user wants to enroll in the proposed system,
the threshold vector, t, and the codeword matrix, C, which contains reference biometric hash
vectors, stored in the database need to be updated. Initially, for new users, the system can use
the existing threshold vector to determine their biometric hash vectors. When the number of
new users reach a pre-defined specific number, the system will update itself (e.g. at night time
when the system is idle) and generate a new threshold vector and a new codeword matrix which
are optimal for the new population.
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Figure 5.2: The illustration of the ECOC guided quantization step in the proposed biometric
hashing scheme
In the proposed system, only the threshold vector, t, is stored additionally in comparison with the
Ngo et. al.’s system [2]. It is used for computing biometric hash vectors at the test stage. Even
if an attacker obtains it, he cannot get any more information since the security of the system
depends on the RP matrix and secret key of the users as in Ngo et. al. ’s system [2]. The
attacker can obtain neither the feature vector nor the biometric template of the user by using the
threshold vector, t, and the codeword matrix, C, since there are infinitely many choices when
getting back from binary biometric hash to the face image.
5.3 Simulation Results
In this section, we test and discuss the performance of the proposed scheme on Carnegie Mellon
University (CMU) face database [98], Cambridge university AT&T face database [91], Multi
Modal Verification for Teleservices and Security applications (M2VTS) face database [92, 93],
and the Sheffield (previously UMIST) face databases [97]. Pre-processing methods such as eye
marking, alignment and head region masking are not applied to the face images. Table 5.1 shows
the number of face images used in the enrollment and test phases.
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Table 5.1: Databases and experimental set-up
Database Number of face images Enrollment stage Authentication stage
CMU 975 images from 13 peo-
ple
The first 15 images of
each user
The following 30 im-
ages of each user
AT&T 400 images from 40 peo-
ple
The first 5 images of
each user
The remaining 5 im-
ages of each user
M2VTS 1480 images from 37 peo-
ple
The first 20 images of
each user
The remaining 20 im-
ages of each user
Sheffield 564 images from 20 peo-
ple
The first 8 images of
each user
The following 8 im-
ages of each user
Table 5.2 shows the total number of genuine and imposter pairs. Note that all enrollment images
for a person are used to generate a single reference biometric hash vector for a person. Each test
image indicated in Table 5.1 is used once in a genuine test and as an impostor for all other users.
Table 5.2: Genuine and imposter pairs in each database
Database Number of genuine pairs Number of imposter pairs
CMU 1 × 30 × 13 = 390 1 × 30 × ((12 × 13) ÷ 2) = 2340
AT&T 1 × 5 × 40 = 200 1 × 5 × ((39 × 40) ÷ 2) = 3900
M2VTS 1 × 20 × 37 = 740 1×20× ((36 × 37) ÷ 2) = 13320
Sheffield 1 × 8 × 20 = 160 1 × 8 × ((19 × 20) ÷ 2) = 1520
5.3.1 Equal Error Rate (EER) Performances
In this part, we test the performance of the proposed scheme. Kong et al. state that if unautho-
rized people steal the secret key and the RNG, the performances of biometric hashing schemes
get worse [17]. Therefore, we simulate two scenarios, in our experiments as shown in Table 5.3.
1. Key-unknown Scenario: An imposter user wants to impersonate a genuine user. However,
she has neither the biometric template nor the secret key of the user. She sends her own biometric
template and a secret key to the system to be authenticated as the genuine user. In tests, we have
used each impostor’s own key for their impostor attempts as well.
2. Key-stolen Scenario: An imposter user obtains secret key of the genuine user. She sends her
own biometric template and the secret key of the genuine user to the system to be authenticated
as the genuine user.
As shown in Table 5.3, the proposed scheme has lower EER in comparison with [2]. We show
the detection error trade-off (DET) curves [35] of the proposed method for key-stolen scenario
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Table 5.3: EER performance comparison between the proposed biometric hashing scheme and
Ngo et al.’s scheme [2]
Length EER (%) of Ngo et al.’s
scheme [2] (PCA+RP)
EER (%) of the pro-
posed scheme
Scenario Database
64 bit % 2.05 % 0.15 Key-unknown CMU
128 bit % 0.98 % 0.00 Key-unknown CMU
256 bit % 0.60 % 0.00 Key-unknown CMU
512 bit % 0.22 % 0.00 Key-unknown CMU
64 bit % 4.10 % 2.50 Key-stolen CMU
128 bit % 2.46 % 0.74 Key-stolen CMU
256 bit % 1.72 % 0.08 Key-stolen CMU
512 bit % 1.18 % 0.07 Key-stolen CMU
64 bit % 12.19 % 6.44 Key-unknown AT&T
128 bit % 7.36 % 4.25 Key-unknown AT&T
256 bit % 5.81 % 1.13 Key-unknown AT&T
512 bit % 3.79 % 0.04 Key-unknown AT&T
64 bit % 16.93 % 13.07 Key-stolen AT&T
128 bit % 13.97 % 9.71 Key-stolen AT&T
256 bit % 12.76 % 7.64 Key-stolen AT&T
512 bit % 12.34 % 8.01 Key-stolen AT&T
64 bit % 18.10 % 10.01 Key-unknown M2VTS
128 bit % 14.56 % 7.55 Key-unknown M2VTS
256 bit % 11.15 % 6.38 Key-unknown M2VTS
512 bit % 9.23 % 5.81 Key-unknown M2VTS
64 bit % 21.36 % 14.17 Key-stolen M2VTS
128 bit % 18.08 % 13.01 Key-stolen M2VTS
256 bit % 16.72 % 10.50 Key-stolen M2VTS
512 bit % 16.09 % 10.00 Key-stolen M2VTS
64 bit % 17.09 % 12.30 Key-unknown Sheffield
128 bit % 16.38 % 7.87 Key-unknown Sheffield
256 bit % 15.05 % 6.25 Key-unknown Sheffield
512 bit % 14.97 % 2.93 Key-unknown Sheffield
64 bit % 21.40 % 17.74 Key-stolen Sheffield
128 bit % 21.92 % 16.91 Key-stolen Sheffield
256 bit % 22.53 % 15.25 Key-stolen Sheffield
512 bit % 23.47 % 14.21 Key-stolen Sheffield
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in Figures 5.3-5.6. In addition, we show genuine-imposter distance histograms and false ac-
cept rate (FAR) - false reject rate (FRR) plots in key-stolen scenario for the proposed method
for the AT&T database for 64 and 128 bits in Figures 5.7-5.10. We attribute the performance
improvements to the better scattering of biometric hash vectors due to the maximization of row
and column separation in the codeword matrix in our method.
The proposed method more dramatically reduces the errors as the length of the biometric hash
vector increases as shown in Table 5.3. The proposed scheme approximately reduces the EER
by half in most of the cases. Furthermore, even in some cases, the proposed scheme perfectly
separates the genuine and imposter users with no errors.
The proposed method maximizes the Hamming distance between the biometric hashes belong-
ing to the different users at the enrollment stage. Thus, we achieve lower EERs in comparison
with [2]. Even in the key-stolen scenario, we see improvements in performance which is pos-
sibly due to better placement of reference biometric hash vectors in the space of all possible
hashes.
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Figure 5.3: DET plots of the proposed method for key-stolen scenario - AT&T database
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Figure 5.4: DET plots of the proposed method for key-stolen scenario - CMU database
  1     2     5     10    20    40  
  1   
  2   
  5   
  10  
  20  
  40  
False Alarm probability (in %)
M
is
s 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
(in
 %
)
DET plot for the M2VTS Database
 
 
64 bit
128 bit
256 bit
512 bit
Figure 5.5: DET plots of the proposed method for key-stolen scenario - M2VTS database
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Figure 5.6: DET plots of the proposed method for key-stolen scenario - Sheffield database
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Figure 5.7: Genuine-Imposter distance histograms of the proposed method for key-stolen sce-
nario in the AT&T database - 64 bit
Figure 5.8: FAR-FRR plots of the proposed method for key-stolen scenario in the AT&T
database - 64 bit
Figure 5.9: Genuine-Imposter distance histograms of the proposed method for key-stolen sce-
nario in the AT&T database - 128 bit
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Figure 5.10: FAR-FRR plots of the proposed method for key-stolen scenario in the AT&T
database - 128 bit
5.4 Comparison of the ECOC Guided Quantization For Biohash-
ing and the Discriminative Biohashing Methods
In this thesis, we propose new biohashing methods by improving some phases of the random
projection based methods. We develop new dimension reduction and quantization methods and
propose the discriminative biohashing method in Chapter 4. Next, we design a new quantiza-
tion method and propose the ECOC guided quantization for biohashing method in Chapter 5.
Our aim is to improve the verification performance of the random projection based methods. In
this section, we compare the performance of the ECOC guided quantization for biohashing and
the discriminative biohashing methods. The comparison of the simulation results can be found
in Table 5.4. The simulation results show that the ECOC guided quantization for biohashing
method performs better than the discriminative biohashing method in most of the cases, espe-
cially when the bit-length of the hash vector is higher than 128. We conclude that the ECOC
guided quantization for biohashing finds better quantization threshold values and thus improves
the performance of the system. It appears that having better quantization thresholds is more
preferable to using more discriminative projections.
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Table 5.4: Comparison of the EER performances of the proposed biohashing methods in chap-
ter 4 and chapter 5
Length EER (%) of the
ECOC guided
quantization for
biohashing [28]
EER (%) of the
discriminative pro-
jection selection
based biohashing
[26] with binary
quantization
EER (%) of the
discriminative pro-
jection selection
based biohashing
[26] with GMM
quantization
Scenario Database
64 bit % 6.44 % 3.83 % 2.73 Key-
unknown
AT&T
128 bit % 4.25 % 2.23 % 1.57 Key-
unknown
AT&T
256 bit % 1.13 % 1.80 % 1.15 Key-
unknown
AT&T
512 bit % 0.04 % 2.48 % 2.10 Key-
unknown
AT&T
64 bit % 13.07 % 14.40 % 13.58 Key-
stolen
AT&T
128 bit % 9.71 % 12.01 % 11.14 Key-
stolen
AT&T
256 bit % 7.64 % 10.80 % 10.23 Key-
stolen
AT&T
512 bit % 8.01 % 10.15 % 9.73 Key-
stolen
AT&T
64 bit % 12.30 % 15.75 % 16.23 Key-
unknown
Sheffield
128 bit % 7.87 % 13.33 % 14.03 Key-
unknown
Sheffield
256 bit % 6.25 % 11.45 % 11.05 Key-
unknown
Sheffield
512 bit % 2.93 % 10.44 % 12.20 Key-
unknown
Sheffield
64 bit % 17.74 % 19.38 % 20.68 Key-
stolen
Sheffield
128 bit % 16.91 % 17.51 % 19.71 Key-
stolen
Sheffield
256 bit % 15.25 % 16.96 % 17.80 Key-
stolen
Sheffield
512 bit % 14.21 % 19.27 % 18.22 Key-
stolen
Sheffield
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5.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we propose a novel biometric hashing scheme based on the proposed quantization
method that maximizes the row and the column separation of the code matrix as in ECOC
classifiers. We maximize the distance between the genuine-impostor pairs as well as decrease the
correlation between the bit positions in biometric hash vectors belonging to different users. The
proposed method has superior performance in comparison with [2]. The proposed quantization
method can be applied to other biometric hashing schemes that employ various feature extraction
techniques.
Chapter 6
Security and Privacy Attacks Against
Biohashing Schemes
6.1 Introduction
Biohashing scheme is recently proposed as a promising template protection method in the lit-
erature [2, 3, 16, 19–21]. Biohashing schemes offer to preserve privacy via randomization and
enhance security via its cancelability property. Although these schemes achieve high perfor-
mance in terms of authentication error rates and offer lower authentication times due to their
binary nature, they are vulnerable to various attacks reported in the literature [17, 22–24].
Kong et al. [17] state that the performance of the biohashing schemes depend on the secrecy
of the user’s secret key and the actual performance of these methods should be evaluated under
key-stolen attack scenario where an attacker gets the secret key of the legitimate user but does
not have her face image. In this scenario, an attacker sends a face image and the secret key of
the user to the system. Then, the system computes a biohash vector by using the data sent by
the impostor. Finally, the system determines whether the claimer is authentic or not. Key-stolen
scenario and its related attacks are addressed in previous chapters of this thesis.
In the literature, Cheung et al. [23] consider a security attack against the random projection
based biohashing method [2]. The considered security attack can be seen as a simplified ver-
sion of one of the security attacks considered in this chapter. They use the pseudo-inverse
operator to approximately invert the random projection operation. However they assume that a
68
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reconstructed biohash can be provided to the verification system directly for verification without
forming a face image which may not be realistic in all cases. In addition, they do not consider
privacy attacks in their paper. In another study, Lee et al. [104] point out that, the attacker does
not need to know the user’s secret key, just knowing the biohash is enough to come up with
a pre-image attack where one can use any random projection matrix to obtain a feature vec-
tor which would produce the exact same biohash as the one that is discovered. However, such
security attacks can be easily prevented by checking whether the user’s secret key is entered
correctly before comparing the biohashes. Therefore we do not consider such attacks in this
chapter. Similar to Cheung et al. [23], Lee et al. [104] do not consider privacy attacks as well.
Other attacks against biohashing methods are performed by Ku¨mmel et al. [22, 24] in the liter-
ature. They assume that an attacker steals some biohash vectors (in this case handwriting data)
from the user and he tries to reconstruct the raw biometric data by using a genetic algorithm or
a spline interpolation function. In these attacks, they need more than one biohash vector gen-
erated from the same biometric data as well as the secret key of the user. They try to perform
a pre-image like attack. Their main aim is to threaten the security not the privacy since they
do not want to reconstruct visually identical or similar handwriting instead they want to recon-
struct a biometric data which can create a high matching score. In fact, it is almost impossible
to reconstruct visually identical or similar biometric data due to huge information loss at the
quantization phase of the biohashing methods.
In this chapter, we consider various attack scenarios that can threaten the privacy of the users
as well as the security of the system. We perform attacks against random projection based bio-
hashing methods [2, 3]. Since the feature extraction and random projection steps are dimension
reducing linear transformations, there exists infinitely many elements which give the same re-
sult. That is, the inverse image of a single point under a linear dimension reduction operator is
of infinite size. However it is easy to obtain a single element from this inverse image set using
a minimum norm solution which is easy to obtain. The proposed attacks can also be performed
for the biohashing systems that we propose in Chapter 3, Chapter 4, and Chapter 5. In Chap-
ter 3, we propose an optimal linear transform based biohashing method. We develop a new
dimension reduction method which results in a better dimension reduction matrix but we again
use a matrix in the dimension reduction phase. In this method, we use exactly the same building
blocks of a biohashing method: 1) Feature extraction, 2)Dimension reduction, and 3)Quantiza-
tion. Eventually, the proposed attack method can be successfully performed for this method.
In Chapter 4, we propose a discriminative biohashing method. We develop a new dimension
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reduction method which selects the rows of the random projection matrix by applying the Fisher
criterion and the indices of the selected rows are stored in the database. When a claimer sends
her face image and the secret key to the system, the system computes the biohash vector by us-
ing the index vector ci. In other words, the proposed method uses a dimension reduction matrix
defined by the user’s secret key as in the random projection based biohashing method although
our method offer a better dimension reduction matrix in order to obtain better error rates. We
also proposed GMM based quantization in this method but it will not be a problem for apply-
ing our proposed attack method since we use another person’s face image in order to invert the
quantization step and the thresholds will be accessible to the attacker. As a result, the proposed
attack method can successfully be performed for this method as well. In Chapter 5, we propose
ECOC guided quantization for biohashing. Thus, we improve the performance of the system by
developing a new quantization method. The feature extraction and dimension reductions phases
are exactly the same as in the random projection based biohashing method. Since we use another
person’s face image in order to invert the quantization phase and the thresholds will be available
to the attacker, this allows us to use the proposed attack method also for this biohashing method.
Consequently, the proposed attack method can also be applied to the variants of the random
projection based biohashing methods even if they use any other quantization method.
6.2 Desired Properties of Biohashes
In this section, we address the desired properties of the biohashes. They are summarized as
follows:
1. The biohash should be irreversible.
When an attacker gets a biohash of a legitimate user, she should not compute the biometric
data of this user. In other words, even if the attacker get biohash h, no information about
the biometric data itself should be obtained due to the desirable property that biohashes
are irreversible.
2. The biohash should be cancelable.
A biohashing scheme needs two inputs;
(a) Biometric image, Im ∈ I where I is a biometric image space,
(b) Secret key, Key ∈ K where K is a key space.
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By using these two inputs, a biohash can be computed as follows:
h = b (Im,Key) , (6.1)
where h is the biohash and b (.) is a biohashing function. Therefore, a legitimate user
can change/update her biohash by only changing her secret key when an attacker gets
her biohash.
3. The biohash should be robust against different biometric images belonging to the same
user.
In real world applications, the users cannot give exactly the same biometric data in each
enrollment session. Thus, the acquired biometric data of the user changes across different
enrollment sessions. Even in such cases, it is expected that the computed biohashes (with
different biometric data acquired in different sessions) of the same user should be similar.
In other words, the biohashes, which are computed from the same user’s biometric data
and secret key, should be close in some distance metric with high probability.
d (b (Im1,Key) , b (Im2,Key)) ≤ t, (6.2)
where d (.) is the function that computes Hamming distance between two inputs, b (.) is a
biohash function that computes biohash by using its inputs, Im1 and Im2 are two biometric
images that belong to the same user and acquired at different sessions, Key is the user’s
secret key and t is the distance threshold for the decision.
4. Biohash should be fragile to the biometric images which do not belong to the legitimate
user.
The biohashes are not strict as the traditional cryptographic hashes. Thus, a single bit
change in the input does not create a huge change at the output. Although, the biohashing
schemes are robust against some changes in the input, they should be sensitive to the
content changes. When the content of the biometric image is changed (different biometric
image belonging to any other person), its corresponding biohash value should be distant
from the biohash of the corresponding legitimate user.
d (b (Im1,Key) , b (Im2,Key)) > t, (6.3)
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where d (.) is the function that computes Hamming distance between two inputs, Im1 and
Im2 are two biometric images that do not belong to the same user, and t is the distance
threshold for the decision.
6.3 Privacy Threats
In this section, we perform attacks against Ngo et al.’s biohashing scheme [2, 3] in order to
test its privacy preservation capability via its irreversibility property. In this attack scenario, we
act as an attacker and try to threaten the privacy of the users who uses Ngo et al.’s biohashing
scheme.
We address privacy flaws of random projection based biohashing schemes. As mentioned in the
beginning of this chapter, our attacks will be applicable to the introduced methods in Chapters
3, 4, and 5 as well.
The main motivation behind this work is to find the minimum norm solution among the elements
which map to the target value in the inverse image of the target value under the linear transfor-
mation. Although Ngo et al. claim that their random projection based biohashing scheme is
irreversible [2, 3], we introduce a biohashing reconstruction method by using the weakness in
the linear transformation steps of Ngo et al.’s biohashing scheme.
6.3.1 Attacks on the Irreversibility Property
In this part, we introduce our proposed attack method based on the minimum norm solution for
random projection based biohashing schemes for face images. This is a new attack which is
proposed by us in the literature. Although there are some works on pre-image attacks against
biohashing schemes [24, 104] in order to threaten the security, there is no work on privacy threats
Figure 6.1: The basic steps of Ngo et al.’s biohashing scheme [2, 3]
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Figure 6.2: Illustration of Ngo et al.’s scheme’s main phases in terms of functions
of biohashing schemes in the literature to the best of our knowledge. In this attack, we assume
that the biohash vector, h, of a legitimate user and her secret key are compromised. In this case,
the attacker wants to recover the face image of the legitimate user by using the biohash vector
and the secret key in order to threaten the privacy of the users. In other words, the attacker wants
to create an artificial biometric data of the user by using her biohash. This artificially generated
biometric data is desired to have the capability of generating false positive verifications although
they are not necessary visually the same as the original biometric data. We can obtain a face
image by inverting a biohash h as follows:
Iˆ = f †
(
g† (q˜ (h))
)
, (6.4)
where Iˆ ∈ Rm×n is the reconstructed face image, h ∈ R`×1 is the biohash vector, q˜ (.), g† (.),
and f † (.) denote a possible inverse function for the quantization, pseudo-inverse function for
the random projection, and pseudo-inverse function for the feature extraction (i.e. Principle
Component Analysis (PCA) [34]) phase in Ngo et al.’s biohashing method respectively.
Since the feature extraction and the random projection phases, which are illustrated in Figure
6.3, are linear transformations, we can find the elements which give the same results from their
inverse image by using a minimum norm solution. Since Ngo et al.’s biohashing scheme reduces
the dimensionality of the input face image in each step of their method, there exist infinitely
many elements which maps to the same element in the inverse image.
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6.3.1.1 The Proposed Attack Method Based on Minimum `2 Norm Solution
In this part, we introduce the proposed attack method based on the min-`2 norm solution. The
details of the proposed attack method are given in the below part.
1. Step 1: The attacker steals a biohash vector, h ∈ {0, 1}` , of a legitimate user either from
a smart card or database etc.
2. Step 2: In Ngo et al.’s biohashing scheme, the elements of the intermediate biohash
vector, z, are binarized with respect to a fixed threshold as follows:
h = q (z) =
 h (i) = 1, if z (i) ≥ t,h (i) = 0, Otherwise, (6.5)
where h ∈ {0, 1}` is the biohash vector of the legitimate user and t is the mean value of
the intermediate biohash vector z.
During this step, the attacker tries to simulate the inverse of the quantization phase in Ngo
et al.’s biohashing scheme as follows:
zˆ = q˜ (h) =
 zˆ (i) = α (i) , if h (i) = 1,zˆ (i) = β (i) , if h (i) = 0, (6.6)
where i = 1, . . . , `, q˜ (.) is the function for inverting the quantization phase of Ngo et al.’s
biohashing scheme, and α (i) is a number larger than the threshold and β (i) is a number
less than the threshold. Since the threshold t would be unknown to the attacker, he needs
to determine a threshold from another face image. Note that for methods which use a
pre-determined threshold (such as the ones in Chapter 4 or 5), the attacker can obtain the
threshold directly and act accordingly.
The attacker uses another face image, which does not belong to the legitimate user, in
order to perform this step of the proposed attack algorithm. He takes a face image, I f ake ∈
Rm×n, which does not belong to any legitimate user. Next, he lexicographically re-orders
it and obtains the face vector, x f ake ∈ R(mn)×1. Then, he applies Principle Component
Analysis (PCA) to the face vector as follows:
y f ake = A(x f ake − w), (6.7)
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where y f ake ∈ Rk×1 is the vector containing PCA coefficients of the face image which does
not belong to the legitimate user.
Then, he projects these PCA coefficients onto lower dimensional space by using the secret
key of the legitimate user.
z f ake = RGS y f ake. (6.8)
Next, he maps the elements of the compromised biohash vector, h, from {0, 1} to {−1, 1}
space as follows:
hˆ =
 hˆ (i) = 1, if h (i) = 1,hˆ (i) = −1, if h (i) = 0, (6.9)
where hˆ is the mapped biohash vector.
The he computes the sample mean value of z f ake:
µ =
1
`
∑`
i=1
z f ake (i) , (6.10)
which would act as the threshold value t in the original system. Then, he computes the
sample standard deviation of z f ake:
σ =
1` ∑`
i=1
(
z f ake (i) − µ
)2
1
2
. (6.11)
Finally, he computes zˆ in the equation 6.6 as follows:
zˆ (i) = µ + σ
(
hˆ (i)
)
, (6.12)
where i = 1, . . . , `. That is, the attacker uses one standard deviation above or below the
threshold value for inverting the quantization step.
3. Step 3: In Ngo et al.’s biohashing scheme, PCA feature vectors are projected by a random
projection matrix which is generated with the user’s secret key as follows:
z = RGS y, (6.13)
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where z∈ R`×1 is the randomly projected PCA feature vector (intermediate biohash vec-
tor), RGS ∈ R`×k is the orthonormal random projection matrix, and y∈ Rk×1 is vector
containing PCA coefficients of a legitimate user.
Since the attacker gets the secret key of the user, he can re-generate RGS of the legitimate
user. Then, he compute R†GS by using the MoorePenrose pseudo-inverse method [1, 105,
106]. Therefore, the attacker performs inverse of the random projection phase with the
help of compromised secret key and by taking into account Ngo et al.’s biohashing scheme
as follows:
yˆ = g† (zˆ) =
(
R†GS
)
zˆ, (6.14)
where g† (.) is the pseudo-inverse function for the random projection in Ngo et al.’s bio-
hashing scheme, RGS ∈ R`×k is the orthonormal random projection matrix generated via
the secret key compromised from the legitimate user, R†GS is the pseudo-inverse matrix of
RGS .
4. Step 4: In Ngo et al.’s biohashing scheme, first, a face image of the user, I ∈ Rm×n, is
lexicographically re-ordered and the face vector, x∈ R(mn)×1, is obtained. Then, PCA is
applied to the face vector as follows:
y = A(x − w), (6.15)
where A ∈ Rk×(mn) is the PCA matrix trained by the face images in the training set, w is
the mean face vector, and y∈ Rk×1 is vector containing PCA coefficients belonging to the
face image of the user.
The attacker computes inverse of the PCA matrix and reconstruct the face image of the
legitimate user.
Iˆ = f† (yˆ) = A†yˆ + w, (6.16)
where f † (.) is the pseudo-inverse function for the feature extraction (i.e. PCA) phase in
Ngo et al.’s biohashing scheme, Iˆ is the reconstructed face image, and A† is the pseudo-
inverse of the PCA matrix.
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6.3.1.2 The Proposed Attack Method Based on Minimum `1 Norm Solution
In this part, we introduce the proposed attack method based on the min-`1 norm solution. This
attack is similar to the attack method based on minimum `2 norm solution introduced in Section
6.3.1.1. The only difference between them is in the third step. In other words, step 1,2 and 4 are
the same in both attack methods. The step 3 for this attack method is explained in the following.
Step 3: In Ngo et al.’s biohashing scheme, PCA feature vectors are projected onto random
projection matrix which is generated with the user’s secret key as follows:
z = RGS y, (6.17)
where z∈ R`×1 is the randomly projected PCA feature vector (intermediate biohash vector),
RGS ∈ R`×k is the orthonormal random projection matrix, and y∈ Rk×1 is vector containing PCA
coefficients of a legitimate user.
Since the attacker gets the secret key of the user, he can re-generate RGS of the legitimate user.
Min-`1 with equality constraints solution [107, 108], which is also known as basis pursuit, finds
the vector with smallest `1 norm that explains the observations z.
min ‖y‖1 subject to z = RGS y, (6.18)
min ‖y‖1 =
∑
i
∣∣∣yi∣∣∣ . (6.19)
If there exists a sufficiently sparse y0 such that z = RGS y0, then the equation 6.18 finds yˆ better
at this step.
6.4 Security Threats
In cryptology, there are cryptographic hash functions which are the members of one-way func-
tions. One-way function is a function that is easy to compute on every input; however, it is hard
to invert given the image of a random input. Cryptographic hash functions take an arbitrary
block of data and return a fixed size bit string. They are mostly used in content authentication,
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Figure 6.3: Security and privacy flaws of Ngo et al.’s scheme
search and indexing applications [109]. In the literature, there are several types of security con-
straints/properties on cryptographic hash functions. These functions are expected to be robust
against the below type of attacks:
1. Pre-Image Resistance: Given a hash h, it is hard to find any message m such that
h = hash(m), (6.20)
where hash(.) is the corresponding cryptographic hash function. This property comes
from the one-wayness. In biohashing schemes, m is analogous to the biometric data of
the user and h is analogous to the biohash vector.
2. Second Pre-Image Resistance: Given an input m1, it is hard to find another input m2,
where m1 , m2 such that
hash (m1) = hash (m2) . (6.21)
This property is sometimes referred as a weak collision resistance in the literature.
3. Collision Resistance: It is hard to find two different messages m1 and m2 such that
hash (m1) = hash (m2) . (6.22)
This property is sometimes referred as a strong collision resistance in the literature.
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Biohashing is totally different than cryptographic hashing. Cryptographic hash is a one-way
function, when a single bit is changed the hash sum becomes completely different due to the
avalanche effect [38]. On the other hand, for biohashing schemes several bits changes should
not affect the performance of the system since they are designed by taking into account the
noisy nature of the biometric templates. Therefore, we cannot expect from biohashing schemes
to have exactly the same properties of cryptographic hashing. However, we use aforementioned
properties in order to define attack models for biohashing schemes in Section 6.4.
6.4.1 Attacks on the Cancelability Property
In this part, we discuss possible attack scenarios on the cancelability property of the biohashing
schemes. Let us assume that an attacker steals the biohash of a legitimate user. The legitimate
user recognizes that her biohash has been stolen and she re-issues a new biohash vector by
changing her secret key. In this case, the attacker wants to authenticate himself by using the old
biohash of the legitimate user. In this case, we assume that providing a biohash directly to a
verification system is possible.
6.4.2 Attack Scenarios for the Minimum `1 and Minimum `2 Norm Solution Based
Attack Methods
In this part, we introduce other possible attack scenarios which uses the minimum `1 and mini-
mum `2 norm solution based attack methods described in Section 6.3.1.2 and Section 6.3.1.1.
These attacks can also threaten the security of the random projection based biohashing schemes
and they are analogous to an attack against the pre-image resistance property of a cryptographic
hash function described in Section 6.4 since they both try to reconstruct the face image of the
legitimate user. Recall that pre-image resistance property states that given a hash h, it is hard to
find any message m such that h = hash(m). Consequently, we come up with three main attack
scenarios which are described below.
1. Scenario 0: Consider a remote biometric verification system where a user and a verifier
communicate via a communication channel and a biohashing scheme based verification
is used. In this scenario, the verification is done via biohash values. From the security
point of view, the attacker wants to cheat the system by getting a legitimate users biohash
during the communication session or directly from the database. Thus, he gets both the
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biohash and the secret key of a legitimate user. Then, he reconstructs the face image of
the legitimate user by using the biohash and the secret key. Finally, he wants to enter the
system by using the reconstructed face image and the secret key of the user.
2. Scenario 1: Consider a remote biometric verification system where a user and a verifier
communicate via a communication channel and a biohashing scheme based verification
is used. In this scenario, the verification is done via biohash values. From the security
point of view, the attacker wants to cheat the system by getting a legitimate users biohash
during the communication session or directly from the database. Thus, he gets the bio-
hash of a legitimate user from this communication channel. He also gets the secret key of
the user. Then, he reconstructs the face image of the legitimate user by using the biohash
and the secret key. However, the user notices that her biohash was stolen and changes/up-
dates her biohash by changing her secret key. Besides, the system administrator increase
the security of the communication channel between the user and the verifier so that the
attacker cannot enter this communication channel (i.e. use SSL (Secure Sockets Layer)
connection). In this case, the attacker wants to authenticate himself to the system by using
the reconstructed face image and the old secret key.
3. Scenario 2: In this scenario, an attacker again gets biohash of a legitimate user from the
communication channel between the user and the verifier. He also acquires the secret
key of the user. Then, he reconstructs the face image of the legitimate user by using the
biohash and the secret key. However, the user notices that her biohash was stolen and
changes/updates her biohash by changing her secret key. Besides, the system administra-
tor increase the security of the communication channel between the user and the verifier
so that the attacker cannot enter this communication channel (i.e. use SSL connection).
On the other hand, the attacker again steals the secret key of the user. Therefore, the
attacker wants to authenticate himself to the system by using the reconstructed face im-
age and the new secret key. This attack scenario is very similar to the key-stolen attack
scenario addressed in previous chapters. The main difference is that this attack scenario
is performed by a skilled imposter since he uses the reconstructed face image of a legiti-
mate user whereas the attacker uses another person’s face image in the key-stolen attack
scenario.
In addition to these attacks, it is obvious that biohashing systems inherently have verification
errors. These verification errors may cause intrinsic failure attacks (i.e., zero-effort attacks, brute
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force attacks) which are derived from the fact that there is always a non-zero probability that two
biometric templates generated from two different individuals are sufficiently alike to produce a
positive match [1]. Thus, an incorrect decision can be made by a biometric recognition system
(e.g., a false accept). For instance, an attacker can try to authenticate herself to the system
by using a biometric data and a secret key which do not belong to any legitimate user. It is
analogous to an attack against the second pre-image resistance or collision resistance property
of a cryptographic hash function described in Section 6.4. This attack scenario is covered as
“key-stolen scenario” in other chapters of this thesis.
6.5 Simulation Settings and Results
In this section, we give the simulation settings and the results of the simulations for privacy and
security attacks.
6.5.1 Simulations for the Privacy Threats: Attacks on the Irreversibility Property
In this part, we give the simulation settings and results of the attacks in order to test the irre-
versibility property of Ngo et al.’s random projection based biohashing scheme for face images
[2]. In simulations, k is set to 1024 for y ∈ Rk×1 which is the vector containing PCA coefficients
belonging to the face image of the user. Besides, `, which is the length of a biohash vector, is
set to {64, 128, 256, 512}.
The reconstructed, original and mean face images are shown in Figure 6.4 - Figure 6.7. We
recontruct visually similar face images by using min `2 and min `1 norm solutions with various
biohash vector lengths. It is obvious that if noise removal filters and some image processing
techniques are applied to the reconstructed face image, it is possible to obtain better images.
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Figure 6.4: Illustration of the original image, mean face image and the reconstructed face
images by using min `2 and min `1 norm solutions with 64 bit biohash vector.
Figure 6.5: Illustration of the original image, mean face image and the reconstructed face
images by using min `2 and min `1 norm solutions with 128 bit biohash vector.
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Figure 6.6: Illustration of the original image, mean face image and the reconstructed face
images by using min `2 and min `1 norm solutions with 256 bit biohash vector.
Figure 6.7: Illustration of the original image, mean face image and the reconstructed face
images by using min `2 and min `1 norm solutions with 512 bit biohash vector.
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6.5.2 Simulations for the Security Attacks
In this part, we give the simulation setting and results for the security attacks against Ngo et
al.’s random projection based biohashing scheme for face images [2]. We perform experiments
in order to demonstrate the general validity of attack models with various face databases. First,
we demonstrate the performance of the proposed attack method on the Cambridge university
AT&T face database [91]. In this database, there are 400 different face images from 10 different
images of each of 40 distinct subjects. The images were taken at different times, varying the
lighting, facial expressions and facial details. The size of the face images are m = 112 and
n = 92. Next, we test the performance of the proposed attack method on the Multi Modal
Verification for Teleservices and Security applications (M2VTS) face database [92]. The face
images in this database are taken from the videos as explained in [93]. That database consists
of face images with various expressions, illumination conditions, angles, age, sex, and glasses.
The size of the face images are m = 48 and n = 64. There are 1480 face images, which consist
of 40 different face poses for 37 different people in the database. Next, we test the performance
of the proposed attack method on the Sheffield (previously UMIST) face databases [97]. The
Sheffield database has 564 different face images belonging to 20 different people. Each people
have various face images with wide range of poses from profile to frontal views. Finally, we
test the performance of the proposed attack method on the AR database which has 3120 face
images belonging to 120 different people’s faces with different facial expressions, illumination
conditions, and occlusions.
6.5.2.1 Simulations for the attacks against cancelability property
In this part, we perform simulations in order to test whether Ngo et al.’s random projection based
biohashing scheme satisfies the cancelability property or not as defined in Section 6.4.1. We also
perform random guess attacks where an attacker tries to guess the biohash of a legitimate user
without knowing her new or any previous biohash vector. In this case, the attacker neither knows
the biometric data nor the secret key of a legitimate user as well. We compare this two attack
scenarios. The simulation results, which are shown in Figure 6.8-Figure 6.11, demonstrate that
random projection based biohashing methods satisfy the cancelability property. In other words,
the attacks against cancelability property are not better than the random guess attacks.
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Figure 6.8: The change of false accept probability with respect to various decision thresholds
for stolen biohash of 64-bit length on AT&T database.
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Figure 6.9: The change of false accept probability with respect to various decision thresholds
for stolen biohash of 128-bit length on M2VTS database.
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Figure 6.10: The change of false accept probability with respect to various decision thresholds
for stolen biohash of 256-bit length on Sheffield database.
Security and Privacy Attacks Against Biohashing Schemes 86
0 64 128 192 256 320 384 448 512
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Decision Threshold
At
ta
ck
er
’s
 F
al
se
 A
cc
ep
t P
ro
ba
bi
lity
 
 
Attack on Cancelability Property
Random Guess Attack
Figure 6.11: The change of false accept probability with respect to various decision thresholds
for stolen biohash of 512-bit length on AR database.
6.5.2.2 Simulations for the attack scenarios using the minimum `1 and minimum `2 norm
solution based attack methods
In this part, we provide the simulation setting and results for the attack scenarios, which are
defined in Section 6.4.2, in Figure 6.16-Figure 6.15 and in Table 6.2-Table 6.1. In particular,
the simulation results for the proposed attack based on min-`1 norm solution can be seen in
Figure 6.16, Figure 6.17 and Table 6.2. Furthermore, the simulation results for the proposed
attack based on min-`2 norm solution can be seen in Figure 6.14, Figure 6.15 and Table 6.1.
The simulation results show the attack based on the min-`2 norm solution performs better than
the attack based on the min-`1 norm solution. It is expected since the PCA feature vectors are
not sparse enough.
It is obvious that when an attacker gets the biohash and the secret key of a legitimate user and
reconstructs the face image of the user, she can enter the system successfully as long as the user
is not aware that her biohash is stolen. This corresponds to the attack scenario 0. The simulation
result of the min-`1 norm solution for 64 bit biohash vectors can be seen in Figure 6.12. In
addition, the simulation result of the min-`2 norm solution for 512 bit biohash vectors can be
seen in Figure 6.13. Note that, this simulation result can also be obtained for all lengths of
biohash vector (64, 128, 256 and 512 bit) on all face databases (AT&T, Sheffield, M2VTS, AR)
by using either the min-`1 norm solution or the min-`2 norm solution.
The proposed attack methods, especially, perform better (i.e. they yield higher EERs) with 256
and 512 bit biohash vectors. From the simulation results, we deduce that as the attacker gets
more information either on biometric data or secret key, he performs more successful attacks. It
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Table 6.1: EER performance of the proposed attack methods based on min-`2 norm solution
against Ngo et al.’s method [2, 3]
Length Key-
unknown
scenario
Key-stolen
scenario
Scenario 0 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Database
64 bit % 12.19 % 16.93 % 100.00 % 11.97 % 22.78 AT&T
128 bit % 7.36 % 13.97 % 100.00 % 7.12 % 21.93 AT&T
256 bit % 5.81 % 12.76 % 100.00 % 5.30 % 26.58 AT&T
512 bit % 3.79 % 12.34 % 100.00 % 3.61 % 45.16 AT&T
64 bit % 17.09 % 21.40 % 100.00 % 21.38 % 30.69 Sheffield
128 bit % 16.38 % 21.92 % 100.00 % 17.49 % 35.12 Sheffield
256 bit % 15.05 % 22.53 % 100.00 % 17.97 % 43.36 Sheffield
512 bit % 14.97 % 23.47 % 100.00 % 14.43 % 58.57 Sheffield
64 bit % 18.10 % 21.36 % 100.00 % 12.20 % 21.30 M2VTS
128 bit % 14.56 % 18.08 % 100.00 % 7.21 % 21.64 M2VTS
256 bit % 11.15 % 16.72 % 100.00 % 5.69 % 27.48 M2VTS
512 bit % 9.23 % 16.09 % 100.00 % 3.87 % 44.58 M2VTS
64 bit % 23.63 % 28.27 % 100.00 % 24.95 % 32.50 AR
128 bit % 18.24 % 27.17 % 100.00 % 21.95 % 32.20 AR
256 bit % 15.82 % 25.50 % 100.00 % 12.45 % 45.86 AR
512 bit % 11.38 % 24.89 % 100.00 % 15.30 % 61.03 AR
is concluded that the attacker is more successful in the second attack scenario than in the first
attack scenario since he also knows the new secret key in this case.
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Figure 6.12: The change of false accept probability with respect to “attack scenario-0” defined
in Section 6.4.2 for 64 bit biohash vector on all face databases (AT&T, Sheffield, M2VTS, AR)
by using the min-`2 norm solution.
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Table 6.2: EER performance of the proposed attack methods based on min-`1 norm solution
against Ngo et al.’s method [2, 3]
Length Key-
unknown
Scenario
Key-stolen
Scenario
Scenario 0 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Database
64 bit % 12.19 % 16.93 % 100.00 % 12.60 % 15.91 AT&T
128 bit % 7.36 % 13.97 % 100.00 % 8.58 % 13.96 AT&T
256 bit % 5.81 % 12.76 % 100.00 % 5.66 % 16.50 AT&T
512 bit % 3.79 % 12.34 % 100.00 % 4.00 % 32.37 AT&T
64 bit % 17.09 % 21.40 % 100.00 % 19.42 % 25.54 Sheffield
128 bit % 16.38 % 21.92 % 100.00 % 15.94 % 26.22 Sheffield
256 bit % 15.05 % 22.53 % 100.00 % 15.28 % 34.82 Sheffield
512 bit % 14.97 % 23.47 % 100.00 % 15.48 % 41.18 Sheffield
64 bit % 18.10 % 21.36 % 100.00 % 11.87 % 16.00 M2VTS
128 bit % 14.56 % 18.08 % 100.00 % 8.15 % 14.84 M2VTS
256 bit % 11.15 % 16.72 % 100.00 % 5.32 % 17.37 M2VTS
512 bit % 9.23 % 16.09 % 100.00 % 4.05 % 34.44 M2VTS
64 bit % 23.63 % 28.27 % 100.00 % 26.55 % 20.33 AR
128 bit % 18.24 % 27.17 % 100.00 % 15.51 % 22.40 AR
256 bit % 15.82 % 25.50 % 100.00 % 13.75 % 23.23 AR
512 bit % 11.38 % 24.89 % 100.00 % 12.23 % 37.44 AR
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Figure 6.13: The change of false accept probability with respect to “attack scenario-0” defined
in Section 6.4.2 for 512 bit biohash vector on all face databases (AT&T, Sheffield, M2VTS,
AR) by using the min-`1 norm solution.
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Figure 6.14: The change of FRR and FAR with respect to the decision threshold for “attack
scenario-1” and “attack scenario-2” defined in Section 6.4.2 with 64 bit biohash vector on
Sheffield database by using the min-`2 norm solution.
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Figure 6.15: The change of FRR and FAR with respect to the decision threshold for “attack
scenario-1” and “attack scenario-2” defined in Section 6.4.2 with 256 bit biohash vector on AR
database by using the min-`2 norm solution.
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Figure 6.16: The change of FRR and FAR with respect to the decision threshold for “attack
scenario-1” and “attack scenario-2” defined in Section 6.4.2 with 128 bit biohash vector on
AT&T database by using the min-`1 norm solution.
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Figure 6.17: The change of FRR and FAR with respect to the decision threshold for “attack
scenario-1” and “attack scenario-2” defined in Section 6.4.2 with 512 bit biohash vector on
M2VTS database by using the min-`1 norm solution.
6.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we categorize the threats into two groups: 1) Privacy threats, 2)Security threats.
We introduce new privacy and security attacks against the random projection based biohashing
schemes. We propose attacks based on minimum norm solutions of linear projections and a
possible inversion of the quantization step. These attacks threaten the privacy of the users as
well as the security of the system. The simulation results demonstrate that the random projection
based biohashing methods do not satisfy the irreversibility property under some conditions and
this makes them vulnerable against severe privacy and security attacks.
In addition to these attacks, there may be other attacks that can be performed against the random
projection based biohashing methods. For instance, the attacker may use a face image database
containing face images which do not belong to any legitimate user instead of reconstructing the
face image by using the biohash and the secret key of the user. Thus, he can use the face image
whose biohash has the minimum Hamming distance with the user’s biohash.
Chapter 7
THRIVE: Threshold Homomorphic
encRyption based secure and privacy
preserving bIometric VErification
system
7.1 Introduction
1 Recently, homomorphic encryption methods are used with biometric feature extraction meth-
ods in order to perform verification via encrypted biometric templates [54, 84–86]. However,
these methods offer solutions in the honest-but-curious model where each party is obliged to
follow the protocol but can arbitrarily analyze the knowledge that it learns during the execution
of the protocol in order to obtain some additional information. Their proposed system is not
designed for the malicious model where each party can arbitrarily deviate from the protocol and
may be corrupted. On the other hand, they do not take into account security and privacy issues
of biometric templates stored in the database [54, 86]. The authors state that their security model
will be improved in the future work by applying encryption methods also on the biometric tem-
plates stored in the database. Furthermore, some of these systems are just designed for a single
biometric modality or a specific feature extraction method which limits their application areas
1This chapter is based on [29]. I would like to especially thank Dr. Mehmet Sabir Kiraz for his valuable contri-
butions to this chapter especially on cryptography related parts.
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[84, 85]. Apart from that, an adversary can enroll himself on behalf of any user to their systems
since they do not offer any solutions for malicious enrollment. Finally, all these systems suffer
from computational complexity.
Biohashing schemes are one of the emerging biometric template protection methods [16, 18–21].
These schemes offer low error rates and fast verification at the authentication stage. However,
they suffer from several attacks reported attacks as shown in Chapter 6 and in the literature
[17, 22–24]. These schemes should be improved in order to be safely used in a wide range of real
life applications. In this chapter, we develop new enrollment and authentication protocols for
biometric verification methods and we call it “THRIVE: Threshold Homomorphic encRyption
based secure and privacy preserving bIometric VErification system”. Our goal is to increase
security and enhance privacy of the biometric schemes. The THRIVE system can work with
any biometric feature extraction scheme whose outputs are binary or can be binarized. Since
biohashing schemes can output binary templates called a biohash, they can be successfully used
with the proposed system. We address adversary attacks (which are introduced in [4]) when a
malicious attacker aims to gain access to the system. By taking into account these adversary
attacks, we develop a new biometric authentication system based on threshold homomorphic
encryption in the malicious model. Our general aim is to increase security of the system and
enhance privacy of biometric templates belonging to the users of the system. The contributions
of the THRIVE system introduced in this chapter can be summarized as follows:
1. A new biometric authentication system (which we call the THRIVE system) is proposed
in the malicious model and the proposed system can be used with any existing biometric
modality whose templates are fixed size vectors and they can be binarized.
2. Only a legitimate user can enroll in the proposed system since a signature scheme is used
at the proposed enrollment stage.
3. Only encrypted versions of binary templates are stored in the database and biometric
templates are never released even during authentication. Thus, the proposed system offers
a new and advanced biometric template protection method without any helper data.
4. Even if an adversary gains an access to the database and steals encrypted biometric tem-
plates, neither he can authenticate himself by using these encrypted biometric templates
due to the authentication protocol nor he can decrypt these encrypted biometric templates
due to the (2, 2)-threshold homomorphic encryption scheme.
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5. Neither the verifier nor the user can perform decryption by themselves on encrypted bio-
metric templates since the (2, 2)-threshold homomorphic encryption scheme is used. In-
stead, the verifier and the user can perform decryption collaboratively using their own
private key shares.
6. The verifier does not need to know the user’s biometric template or private key in order to
authenticate the user.
7. The THRIVE system can be used in the applications where the user does not trust the
verifier since the user does not need to reveal her biometric template and/or private key in
order to authenticate herself and the verifier does not need to reveal any data to the user at
the proposed authentication protocol.
8. Authentication is performed via randomized templates which ensures privacy.
9. Even if an adversary intercepts the communication channel between the user and the veri-
fier, he cannot obtain any useful information on the biometric template since all exchanged
messages are randomized and/or encrypted and he cannot perform decryption due to the
(2, 2)-threshold homomorphic encryption scheme. Furthermore, he cannot use the ob-
tained data from message exchanges in this communication channel since nonce and sig-
nature schemes are used together in the authentication.
10. The THRIVE system is a two-factor authentication system (biometric and secret key) and
is secure against illegal authentication attempts. In other words, a malicious adversary
cannot gain access to the proposed system without having the biometric data and the
private key of a legitimate user by performing adversary attacks described in [4] as well
as hill-climbing attacks [30–33].
11. In the THRIVE system, the generated protected biometric templates are irreversible since
they are encrypted.
12. In the THRIVE system, the generated protected biometric templates are cancelable. Even
if they are stolen, they can be re-generated.
13. The THRIVE system can generate a number of protected templates from the same bio-
metric data of a user due to the randomized encryption and biohashing. Thus, it ensures
diversity.
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14. The THRIVE system is implemented and a successful authentication protocol run requires
0.218 seconds on average. Consequently, the proposed system is sufficiently efficient to
be used in real world applications.
7.2 Attacks on Biometric Systems
In the literature, attacks to a biometric system are classified into two categories [4]: 1) Intrinsic
failure attacks, 2) Adversary attacks. These attacks are introduced in the below part. In these
attacks, an adversary may have two main aims:
1. Threaten security by gaining access to the system,
2. Threaten privacy by obtaining the biometric data of a user.
7.2.1 Intrinsic failure attacks
Intrinsic failure attacks (i.e., zero-effort attacks, brute force attacks) [1] are derived from the
fact that there is always a non-zero probability that two biometric templates generated from
two different individuals are sufficiently alike to produce a positive match. Thus, an incorrect
decision can be made by a biometric recognition system (e.g., a false accept).
7.2.2 Adversary attacks
Adversary attacks are caused by a malicious behavior which can be classified into two cate-
gories: 1) Direct attacks, 2) Indirect attacks. Ratha et al. define a comprehensive security and
privacy framework that captures eight possible adversarial attack scenarios to a biometric recog-
nition system [4] as depicted in Figure 7.1: 1- Spoofing&Mimicry attack, 2- Replay attack, 3-
Attack against the feature extractor, 4- Tampering the communication channel between the fea-
ture extractor and the matcher, 5- Attack against the matcher, 6- Attack against the database,
7-Tampering the communication channel between the database and the matcher, 8- Override
Response.
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Figure 7.1: Possible attack points to a biometric recognition system (adapted from [4]).
7.2.2.1 Direct Attacks
Only spoofing (physiological biometric traits) & mimicry (behavioral biometric traits) attacks
can be classified under direct attacks. These kinds of attacks are carried out by presenting a
fake biometric template to the sensor, thus the adversary aims to gain access to the system by
impersonating an authentic user [51, 52, 110]. The definitions of these attacks are given in the
below.
Attack 1.a - Spoofing attack: This attack corresponds to the first attack type in Figure 7.1. In
this attack, a fake biometric trait (i.e., face, fingerprint, face) or an artifact (i.e. gummy finger,
high quality face image) is introduced to the sensor of a biometric recognition system in order
to gain access to the system as a legitimate user [111, 112]. This attack is directly performed on
the biometric sensor and the adversary does not need to know anything about the system (i.e.
matching algorithm, feature extraction method).
Attack 1.b - Mimicry attack: This attack also corresponds to the first attack type in Figure 7.1.
In this attack, a fake behavioral trait (e.g., signature, voice) is introduced to the sensor of a
biometric recognition system in order to gain access to the system as a legitimate user [113]. In
this type of attack, the adversary tries to break the system by imitating a legitimate user. This
attack is directly performed on the biometric sensor and the adversary does not need to know
anything about the system (i.e. matching algorithm, feature extraction method).
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7.2.2.2 Indirect Attacks
Indirect attacks, on the other hand, include all the remaining seven attacks depicted in Figure 7.1.
A Trojan horse might be used in order to carry out the third attack (attack against the feature
extractor) and the fifth attack (attack against the matcher). In these cases, an adversary replaces
the feature extractor or the matcher respectively, and outputs a feature vector or matching score
(also final decision) different from the original. The sixth attack (attack against the database)
targets the system database where an adversary aims to manipulate biometric templates (steal,
delete, substitute, change, or add) in order to gain access to the system. The second attack type
(replay attack), the fourth attack type (tampering the communication channel between the fea-
ture extractor and the matcher), the seventh attack type (tampering the communication channel
between the database and the matcher) and the eight attack type (override response) focus on
exploiting possible vulnerabilities in the communication channels of a biometric recognition
system in order to extract, add or change the information. One of the most common indirect
attack is the hill-climbing attack which can be performed by using the output of the matcher
[30–33]. The definitions of aforementioned attacks are given in the below.
Attack 2 - Replay attack between the biometric sensor and the feature extractor: This
attack corresponds to the second attack type in Figure 7.1. It uses weaknesses in the communi-
cation channel between the biometric sensor and the feature extractor in order to gain access to
the system. In this attack, an adversary eavesdrops on the communication channel between the
biometric sensor and the feature extractor and tries to obtain the biometric template of a user.
When message interchange is over, the adversary connects to the feature extractor and sends the
obtained biometric template of the user to the feature extractor in order to gain access to the
system as a legitimate user.
Attack 3 - Attack against the feature extractor: This attack corresponds to the third attack
type in Figure 7.1. It can be performed by using a Trojan horse that replaces the feature extractor
and outputs a feature vector different than the original.
Attack 4 - Tampering the communication channel between the feature extractor and the
matcher: This attack corresponds to the fourth attack type in Figure 7.1. In this attack, an adver-
sary aims either to obtain information from the communication channel or to change information
in the communication channel.
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Attack 5 - Attack against the matcher: This attack corresponds to the fifth attack type in
Figure 7.1. It can be performed by using a Trojan horse that replaces the matcher and outputs a
matching score different than the original.
Attack 6 - Attacks against the database: This attack corresponds to the sixth attack type in
Figure 7.1. In this attack, an adversary aims to manipulate biometric templates (steal, delete,
substitute, change, or add) stored in the database.
Attack 7 - Tampering the communication channel between the database and the matcher:
This attack corresponds to the seventh attack type in Figure 7.1. In this attack, an adversary
aims either to get information from the communication channel or to change the information in
the communication channel by manipulating the biometric data.
Attack 8 - Override response: This attack corresponds to the eight attack type in Figure 7.1. In
a biometric authentication system, the verifier sends its decision (either Accept or Reject) to the
user after making some computations. In this attack, an adversary aims to change the response
of the verifier in order to gain access to the system.
Attack 9 - Hill-climbing attack: In this attack, an adversary iteratively updates a synthetically
created biometric template using a specific modification scheme according to the score given by
the matcher. It is assumed that the adversary can access the scores. When the score exceeds a
fixed decision threshold, adversary gains access to the system.
7.3 Preliminaries
7.3.1 Threshold Homomorphic Cryptosystem
In this section, we briefly describe underlying cryptographic primitives of the protocols. Given
a public key encryption scheme, let m ∈ M denote its message or plaintext space, c ∈ C the
ciphertext space, and r ∈ R its randomness. Let c = Encpk(m; r) depict an encryption of m
under the public key pk where r is a random value. Let sk be its corresponding private key,
which allows the holder to retrieve a message from a ciphertext. The decryption is done with
the private key sk as m = Decsk(c).
In a (t, n)-threshold cryptosystem, the aim is to distribute the knowledge of a private key among
parties P1, . . . , Pn such that at least t of these parties are required for successful decryption. In
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Table 7.1: Comparison between the THRIVE system and the existing solutions
THRIVE Salting
Based
Schemes
Non-
Invertible
Trans-
form
Based
Schemes
Key
Binding
Schemes
Key
Gener-
ation
Schemes
[83] [87] [84] [54,
86]
Irreversibility Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cancelability Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Diversity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Helper Data
Usage
No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No
Homomorphic
Encryption
Yes No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Threshold
Homo-
morphic
Encryption
Yes No No No No No No No No
Malicious
Attack
Model
Yes No No No No No No No No
other words, each party holds a ’share’ of the private key, the overall private key can collabora-
tively be reconstructed to let them recover the message in a given ciphertext. On the other hand,
there is a public key that is used as in a regular public key scheme to perform decryption. More
formally, let P1, . . . , Pn be the participants. We define a (t, n)-threshold encryption scheme with
three phases as follows:
• In the key generation phase, each participant Pi receives a pair (pki, ski), where pki and
ski are the shares of the public and secret key, respectively. Then, the overall public key
pk is constructed by collaboratively combining the shares. Finally pk is broadcast to allow
anyone to encrypt messages inM. The shares of this public key are also broadcast which
allow all parties to check the correctness of the decryption process.
• The encryption phase is done as in any public key encryption cryptosystem. If m ∈ M is
the message, a (secret) random value r from R is chosen and c = Encpk(m; r) is broadcast
under a public key pk.
• In the threshold decryption phase, given that t (or more) participants agree to decrypt a
ciphertext c, they follow two steps. First, each participant produces a decryption share
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by performing S i j = Decski j (c), j = 1, . . . , t. After broadcasting S i j , they all can apply a
reconstruction function Z on these shares so that they can recover the original message
by performing m = Z(S i1 , . . . , S it ) where Pi1 , . . . , Pit represent the group of t participants
willing to recover m.
In case of a (t, n)-threshold scheme, the additional requirement is that if less than t parties gather
their correct shares of the decryption of a given ciphertext, they will get no information what-
soever about the plaintext. In the proposed system, we use the (2, 2)-threshold cryptosystem
between the claimer (the user) and the verifier where both players must cooperate in order to
decrypt.
A public key encryption scheme is said to be additively homomorphic if given c1 = Enc(m1; r1)
and c2 = Enc(m2; r2) it follows that c1c2 = Enc(m1 + m2; r3). As a consequence, it is also true
that Enc(m; r)s is equal to Enc(ms; rs) for a known integer s. Another consequence of these
properties is the re-randomization of encryption, by observing that Enc(m; r)Enc(0; r′) is a new
encryption whose plaintext is again m (and its randomness is r′′).
There are various versions of threshold homomorphic cryptosystems. The most widely used
are ElGamal [114] or Paillier [115] cryptosystems. Threshold homomorphic ElGamal has the
drawback of only allowing decryption of values belonging to a relatively small set, for which it
is feasible to compute discrete logs. On the other hand, Paillier does not have this problem and
allows decryption of encrypted values in an arbitrarily large set (e.g., 1024-bit integers). How-
ever, the distributed key generation protocol for threshold Paillier is very expensive compared
to that for threshold ElGamal. In the proposed protocol, we consider a variant of the threshold
decryption protocol, the so-called private threshold decryption [116]. Here, the requirement is
that one of the t parties will be the only party who will recover the secret. This is easily achieved:
all t − 1 other parties follow the protocol, and broadcast their shares (along with the proofs of
correctness). The party who will learn the plaintext proceeds with the decryption process pri-
vately, collects all decryption shares from the t − 1 other parties, and privately reconstructs the
message. Note that the remaining parties will not get any information about this message.
7.3.2 The Paillier Encryption System
The Paillier cryptosystem, which is invented by Pascal Paillier in 1999, is a probabilistic asym-
metric algorithm for public key cryptography [115]. In this part, we briefly describe the Paillier
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encryption algorithm. In the key generation phase; an RSA common modulus n = pq with p
and q large primes is generated and the Carmichael function of n : λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1) is
computed. Then, a generator g of Z∗
n2
such that g = 1(mod n) is computed. Next, the public key,
(n, g) is published while λ forms the secret key. Finally, the encryption of a message m ∈ Zn is
computed as:
c = gmrn (mod n2), (7.1)
where r ∈R Z∗n.
Moreover, the decryption is performed as follows:
m =
L(cλ(mod n2))
L(gλ(mod n2))
(mod n), (7.2)
where, for convenience, we simply define L(x) = (x − 1)/n.
7.3.3 Digital Signatures
A digital signature is a cryptographic primitive which is used for proving the authenticity of its
digital content. The digital signatures are used to associate the user’s identity to the electronic
documents. They should be easy to produce, check and difficult to forge. They are generated
by using the private key and verified by using the public key. Thus, only the user can perform
digital signature operation whereas everybody can verify it. Eventually, the digital signature
schemes have two main stages:
• Signature creation,
• Signature verification.
In the literature, there are two widely used digital signature schemes: 1) RSA digital signa-
ture scheme, 2) Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) [117]. Here we describe the RSA digital
signature scheme.
Signature creation stage: A signer follows the below steps for performing signature opera-
tion:
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1. She chooses secret odd primes p, q and computes n = pq.
2. She chooses eA with gcd (eA,Φ (n)) = 1 where gcd(.) denotes the greatest common divisor
function of its inputs and Φ (n) denotes Euler’s phi function.
3. She computes dA = e−1A mod Φ (n). Therefore, she computes her public (eA, n) and pri-
vate keys (dA, p, q).
4. She signs the message m as in the following.
y ≡ mdA mod n. (7.3)
5. She sends the signed message (y,m) to the verifier.
Signature verification stage: A verifier receives (y,m) and downloads the signer’s public
keys (eA, n). Then, he computes
z ≡ yeA mod n. (7.4)
The signature is valid iff m ≡ z.
7.3.4 Biometric Verification Scheme
Biometric verification schemes perform an automatic verification of a user based on her specific
biometric data (e.g., face, fingerprint, iris). There are two main stages in these schemes: 1) En-
rollment stage, and 2) Authentication stage. The user is enrolled to the system at the enrollment
stage. Then, the user again provides her biometric data to the system at the authentication stage
in order to prove her identity. Any biometric scheme, which provides binary fixed size templates
or whose templates can be binarized, can work with the proposed threshold homomorphic cryp-
tosystem. The THRIVE system can work with any biometric feature extraction method which
produces fixed size vectors as templates and perform verification with distance calculations be-
tween the enrolled and the provided template at the authentication stage. When the output of a
biometric feature extraction method is not binary, locality sensitive hashing can be used in order
to binarize the feature vector [118]. After binarization, the binary templates can successfully
be used with the proposed system. In this chapter, we use biohashing as an example algorithm
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for extracting binary biometric templates. Although biohashing has its own security and privacy
preservation mechanism, we do not rely on these for the security or the privacy preservation of
the proposed system. Thus it can be replaced with any other binary feature extraction method.
We call the fixed size binary biometric templates as ”biohash” in this chapter although we are
not limited to ”biohashing” method for obtaining them.
Biohashing schemes are simple yet powerful biometric template protection methods [16, 18–
21]. Biohash is a binary and pseudo-random representation of a biometric template. Biohashing
schemes use two inputs: 1) Biometric template, 2) User’s secret key. A biometric feature vec-
tor is transformed into a lower dimension sub-space using a pseudo-random set of orthogonal
vectors which are generated from the user’s secret key. Then, the result is binarized to produce
a pseudo-random bit-string which is called the biohash. In an ideal case, the distance between
the biohashes belonging to the biometric templates of the same user is expected to be relatively
small. On the other hand, the distance between the biohashes belonging to different users is
expected to be sufficiently high to achieve higher recognition rates.
In this part, we describe the random projection (RP) based biohashing scheme proposed by Ngo
et al. [2]. In a RP based biohashing scheme, there are three main phases: 1) Feature extraction,
2) Random projection, 3) Quantization. These steps for the face biometric are explained below.
7.3.4.1 Feature Extraction
At this phase, face images in the training set, which are collected during the enrollment stage,
are used. The set has training face images belonging to the registered users, Ii, j ∈ Rm×n where
i = 1, . . . ,K and K denotes number of users, j = 1, . . . , L and L denotes number of training
images per user. The faces images are lexicographically re-ordered and the training face vectors,
xi, j ∈ R(mn)×1, are obtained. Then, Principle Component Analysis (PCA) [34] is applied to the
face images in the training set for feature extraction as follows:
yi, j = A(xi, j − w), (7.5)
where A ∈ Rk×(mn) is the PCA matrix trained by the face images in the training set, w is the mean
face vector, and yi, j ∈ Rk×1 is vector containing PCA coefficients belonging to the jth training
image of the ith user.
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7.3.4.2 Random Projection
At this phase, a RP matrix, R ∈ R`×k, is generated to reduce the dimension of the PCA coef-
ficient vectors. The RP matrix elements are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) and
generated from a Gauss distribution with zero mean and unit variance by using a Random Num-
ber Generator (RNG) with a seed derived from the user’s secret key. The Gram-Schmidt (GS)
procedure is applied to obtain an orthonormal projection matrix RGS ∈ R`×k to have more dis-
tinct projections. Finally, PCA coefficients are projected onto a lower `-dimensional subspace
as follows:
zi, j = RGS yi, j, (7.6)
where zi, j ∈ R`×1 is an intermediate biohash vector belonging to the jth training image of the ith
user.
7.3.4.3 Quantization
At this phase, the intermediate biohash vector zi, j elements are binarized with respect to a thresh-
old as follows:
λi, j (k) =
 1 if zi, j (k) ≥ β,0 Otherwise, (7.7)
where λi, j ∈ {0, 1}` denotes biohash vector of the jth training image of the ith user and β denotes
the mean value of the intermediate biohash vector zi, j.
The computed binary biohashes are stored in the database in the enrollment stage for verification
purpose during the authentication stage. The user is authenticated when the Hamming distance
between Benroll (which denotes the biohash of the user generated at the enrollment stage) and
Bauth (which denotes the biohash of the user generated at the authentication stage) is below a
pre-determined distance threshold µ as follows:
n∑
k=1
Benroll (k) ⊕ Bauth (k) ≤ µ, (7.8)
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Figure 7.2: Illustration of the THRIVE enrollment stage: the user has control over the biometric
sensor, the feature extractor and the biohash generator whereas the verifier has control over the
database.
where ⊕ denotes the binary XOR (exclusive OR) operator. Therefore, the verifier decides
whether the user is legitimate or not using the pre-defined distance threshold.
7.4 The Proposed Biometric Authentication System
In this section, the proposed biometric authentication system is introduced. In the proposed
system, there are two major roles: 1. User (U) and 2. Verifier (V). The user has control of
the biometric sensor, the feature extractor, and the biohash generator whereas the verifier has
control of the database and the matcher. We assume that there is a trusted third party (TTP)
which initially sets up the system public/private keys.
The TTP distributes the keys in the proposed THRIVE system. There are public-private key
pairs (pki, (sk1i , sk
2
i )) which are shared between the user and the verifier. pki is the public key
of the ith user, Ui, and both the user and the verifier have it. Recall that, when an enrollment
biometric template is encrypted by pki, this can solely be decrypted using the private key shares
of the user (sk1i ) and the verifier (sk
2
i ) collaboratively since the proposed system is based on
the (2, 2)-threshold homomorphic cryptosystem. Here, sk1i is the private key share of the i
th
user, Ui, and sk2i is the private key share of the verifier. Besides, there is a public-private key
pair (pkUi , skUi) which belongs to the i
th user, Ui, where pkUi is the public key and skUi is its
associated private key in order to perform the signature operation. The verifier also has the
public key pkUi of the i
th user, Ui.
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User (Ui) Verifier (V)
Public: pkUi , pki Public: pki, pkUi
Private: skUi , sk1i ,Benrolli Private: sk
2
i
Compute Ci = Encpki
(
Benrolli
)
−
SignskUi (Ci)−−−−−−−−−−→
Verify & Store SignskUi (Ci)
Figure 7.3: The THRIVE Enrollment Protocol
7.4.1 Enrollment Stage
Access rights of the verifier and the user to the biometric authentication system at the enrollment
stage are illustrated in Figure 7.2. At this stage, the ith user, Ui, has control over the biometric
sensor, the feature extractor, and the biohash generator whereas the verifier has control over the
database. It is worth mentioning that biometric sensor authentication must be achieved in the
proposed system before executing the enrollment protocol to prevent unauthorized sensors to be
used as clients in the system by malicious users. However this is not explicitly indicated in the
protocol in order not to clutter the chapter. The proposed enrollment protocol is illustrated in
Figure 7.3 and steps of the proposed enrollment protocol are introduced as follows:
1. Step 1: The ith user, Ui, computes her biohash, Benrolli . Next, the user encrypts her
biohash, Ci = Encpki
(
Benrolli
)
, by using the public key pki. Then, the user signs her
encrypted biohash, SignskUi (Ci), and sends it to the verifier.
2. Step 2: The verifier verifies SignskUi (Ci) of Ui by using pkUi and stores it in the database.
These data will be used for verification at the authentication stage.
Recall that the proposed enrollment protocol uses the (2, 2)-threshold homomorphic cryptosys-
tem. Namely, both the user and the verifier have to cooperate in order to decrypt a ciphertext.
Furthermore, the signature ensures that the data stored in the database are generated by a legiti-
mate user.
Lemma 1. Biohashes are not revealed at the enrollment stage.
Proof. (Sketch) At the enrollment stage, user first encrypts her biohash and then signs it. Af-
ter these computations, the user sends her encrypted and signed biohash (SignskUi (Ci)) to the
verifier. Since the user’s biohash is not sent in plain form, biohashes are not revealed at the
enrollment stage.
THRIVE 106
Figure 7.4: Illustration of the THRIVE authentication stage: the user has control over the
biometric sensor, the feature extractor and the biohash generator whereas the verifier has control
over the database, the matcher and the decision maker.
Lemma 2. An adversary cannot register as a legitimate user at the enrollment stage.
Proof. (Sketch) At the enrollment stage, user encrypts her biohash by using the public key
pki and then signs her encrypted biohash by using her private key skUi . Thus, the user sends
encrypted and signed biohash (SignskUi (Ci)) to the verifier. The verifier knows pkUi of each
genuine user. Since verifier verifies the signature of the user, an adversary cannot register himself
as a genuine user without having the private key of the user skUi for computing SignskUi (Ci).
7.4.2 Authentication Stage
Access rights of the verifier and the user to the biometric authentication system at the authen-
tication stage are illustrated in Figure 7.4. At this stage, the ith user, Ui, has control over the
biometric sensor, the feature extractor, and the biohash generator whereas the verifier has con-
trol over the database, the matcher and the decision maker. The user Ui tries to prove herself to
the verifier by executing the proposed authentication protocol shown in Figure 7.5. Similar to
the enrollment case, the biometric sensor must be authorized by the system before the authenti-
cation protocol is carried out. Steps of the proposed authentication protocol are as introduced as
follows:
1. Step 1: The ith user wants to verify her identity to the verifier by using her biohash and
sends connection request to the verifier. Then, the ith user, Ui, computes her biohash
Bauthi . Note that the user cannot produce exactly the same biometric template at each at-
tempt and this results in different biohashes computed by the same user. Therefore, Benrolli
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User (Ui) Verifier (V)
Public: pkUi , pki Public: pkUi , pki, SignskUi (Ci)
Private: skUi , sk1i ,Bauthi Private: sk
2
i
Choose ri ∈R {0, 1}`
Compute C′i = Encpki(ri + Bauthi)
Compute X = Decsk1i (C
′
i )
−−−−−−−−−−−−
C′i ,X,nonceUi−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Retrieve SignskUi (Ci) from the database
←−−−−−−−−−−
SignskUi (Ci),nonceV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Verify SignskUi (Ci)
Compute C′′i = Encpki(ri) ·Ci = Encpki(ri + Benrolli)
Compute Y = Decsk1i (C
′′
i )
−
SignskUi (Encpki(ri),Y,nonceUi ,nonceV )−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Verify SignskUi (Encpki(ri),Y,nonceUi ,nonceV )
Compute C′′i = Encpki(ri) ·Ci
Compute Ti = Z(X,Decsk2i (C′i ))
Compute Wi = Z(Y,Decsk2i (C′′i ))
Compute
∑n
j=1 Ti( j) ⊕Wi( j) ≤ µ
←−−−−−−−−−−−Accept or Reject−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Figure 7.5: The THRIVE Authentication Protocol
and Bauthi are different although they are assumed to be generated by the same user at dif-
ferent sessions (enrollment and authentication). First of all, the user chooses a random
vector r ∈R {0, 1}` where ` is the length of the biohash vector and ∈R denotes that the
variable is chosen uniformly randomly. She computes C′i = Encpki(ri + Bauthi) by using
the public key pki. Then, she performs partial decryption over C′i , which is denoted by
X = Decsk1i (C
′
i ), by using her private key share sk
1
i . Then, the i
th user generates a nonce
called nonceUi which is an arbitrary number which is used only once in a cryptographic
communication. nonceUi contains information about user id, session id and time stamp.
Finally, the user sends C′i , X, nonceUi to the verifier.
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2. Step 2: The verifier retrieves SignskUi (Ci) from the database where Ci = Encpki
(
Benrolli
)
.
Then, it generates a nonce called nonceV which contains information about the verifier,
session id and time stamp. Finally, it sends SignskUi (Ci),nonceV to the user.
3. Step 3: The user verifies SignskUi (Ci) by using public key pkUi . She computes C
′′
i =
Encpki(ri +Benrolli). Thanks to the homomorphic encryption scheme properties. Note that
C′′i = Encpki(ri + Benrolli) = Encpki(ri) · Ci due to the homomorphic encryption. Then,
she performs partial decryption over C′′i , which is denoted by Y = Decsk1i (C
′′
i ), by using
her private key share sk1i . Finally, she sends SignskUi (Encpki(ri),Y,nonceUi ,nonceV ) to the
verifier.
4. Step 4: The verifier verifies the signature, SignskUi (Encpki(ri),Y,nonceUi ,nonceV ), by us-
ing the public key pkUi . Then, it computes C
′′
i = Encpki(ri) · Ci since it does not trust the
user. Note that the verifier also has to compute C′′i in order to verify that C
′′
i is computed
correctly by the user. Next, it performs full decryption by using reconstruction function,
Z(.), whose inputs are X and Decsk2i (C′i ) and computes Ti = ri + Benrolli . Similarly, it
performs full decryption by using reconstruction function, Z(.), whose inputs are Y and
Decsk2i (C
′′
i ) and computes Wi = ri + Bauthi . Finally, the Hamming distance [95] between
Ti = ri + Benrolli and Wi = ri + Bauthi is computed and and compared to a threshold as
follows:
n∑
j=1
Ti ( j) ⊕Wi ( j) ≤ µ, (7.9)
where Ti ( j) and Wi ( j) is the jth bit of Ti and Wi respectively, µ is a pre-defined distance
threshold. Therefore, the verifier decides whether the user is authentic with respect to the
pre-defined distance threshold. Note that the Hamming distance between Ti = ri +Benrolli
and Wi = ri + Bauthi is equal to the Hamming distance between Benrolli and Bauthi .
5. Step 5: Finally, the verifier sends its decision (either Accept or Reject) to the user. How-
ever, the user may get dummy output if there is an error or an attack (i.e., override re-
sponse attack) in the communication channel. The proposed system can easily be updated
to cope with such an attack, for instance, by allowing the verifier to sign its decision in-
cluding the nonces generated during the authentication session (i.e. either Sign(Accept,
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nonceUi , nonceV )or Sign (Reject, nonceUi , nonceV ) and then send it to the user. In this
way, authenticity, integrity and origin of the data can easily be verified. Besides, signing
the nonces (nonceUi and nonceV ) also make the communication unique and avoids replay
attacks.
Lemma 3. Biohashes are not revealed at the authentication stage.
Proof. Authentication is performed in a randomized domain. In other words, the authentication
is determined by comparing Ti and Wi. An adversary can only obtain Ti and Wi which are
revealed at the authentication stage. Recall that these are randomized biohashes. Thus, from
the adversary’s perspective, there are three unknowns (ri, Benrolli and Bauthi) and two equations
which are shown in the below.
Ti = ri + Benrolli , (7.10)
Wi = ri + Bauthi , (7.11)
where ri is the random number generated by the ith user. Since this is a system of linear equations
with fewer equations than unknowns, the system has infinitely many solutions. Consequently, it
is impossible for the adversary to obtain a legitimate user’s biohash by using Ti and Wi which are
revealed at the authentication stage. As a result, the proposed biometric authentication system
ensures security and privacy.
7.5 Security and Privacy Analysis
In this section, the security and privacy preservation capability of the THRIVE system is ana-
lyzed. Further details are given below.
7.5.1 Security and privacy arguments against possible attacks
In addition to the malicious party attacks, Ratha et al. classify adversary attacks against bio-
metric systems into two groups [4] in the literature: 1) Direct attacks, 2) Indirect attacks. They
define eight main attack points to a biometric system as illustrated in Figure 7.1. These attacks
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are introduced in Section II - Attacks on Biometric Systems. In these attacks, there are two main
threats:
1. the adversary can threaten the security by gaining access to the proposed system,
2. the adversary can threaten the privacy by obtaining the biometric data of a user or the
users.
There are some other attack types in the literature e.g. denial-of-service (DoS) attack [119]. DoS
attack is an adversary attack which aims to make the system unavailable to its legitimate users.
Note that, when an adversary just aims to prevent a legitimate user from gaining access to the
proposed system, he can succeed in such DoS attacks. The proposed system does not provide
protection against DoS attacks and these type of attacks are out of scope for this chapter. The
proposed system aims to improve the security against illegal authentication attempts. Besides,
the proposed system enhances privacy of the biometric data of the users.
In this section, informal security and privacy analysis of the proposed biometric authentication
system is made against the adversary attacks (including hill climbing attack which is a special
case of the indirect attacks) which are classified as follows:
1. Direct Attacks
(a) Attack 1 - Spoofing & Mimicry attacks
2. Indirect Attacks
(a) Attack 2 - Replay attack
(b) Attack 3 - Attack against the feature extractor
(c) Attack 4 - Tampering the communication channel between the feature extractor and
the matcher
(d) Attack 5 - Attack against the matcher
(e) Attack 6 - Attack against the database
(f) Attack 7 - Tampering the communication channel between the database and the
matcher
(g) Attack 8 - Override response
(h) Attack 9 - Hill-climbing attack
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1. Protection against Attack 1 - Spoofing & Mimicry attack: An adversary can neither
gain access to the proposed system nor obtain biometric template of a user by performing a
spoofing & mimicry attack. Let us assume that an adversary introduces a fake biometric data to
the sensor in order to impersonate a real user. Even if the fake biometric data is very similar to
the original biometric data of the user, the adversary cannot gain access to the proposed system
since he does not know the private keys of the user (i.e. the user’s private key share (sk1i ) and
the user’s private key skUi for signature) which are also required at the authentication stage. In
other words, the proposed system is a two-factor authentication system where a claimer must
provide biometric data and her private key simultaneously at each authentication attempt.
On the other hand, let us assume that the adversary obtains private keys of the user. In this
case, security of the proposed system depends on the secrecy of the biometric data. As soon
as the adversary does not provide similar biometric data, he cannot gain access to the proposed
system. Note that the adversary cannot obtain the original biometric data of the user even if he
obtains private keys of the user since the (2,2)-threshold homomorphic cryptosystem is used.
Therefore, the adversary cannot perform decryption over Ci = Encpki
(
Benrolli
)
since he does not
know private key share of the user (i.e. sk1i ). Consequently, the proposed system also preserves
the privacy of the users.
2. Protection against Attack 2 - Replay Attack: An adversary cannot gain access to the
proposed system by performing a replay attack. Let us assume that an adversary eavesdrops on
the communication channel between the biometric sensor and the feature extractor. Then, he
can only obtain the biometric template of a legitimate user. The adversary, however, cannot gain
access to the proposed system since he does not know private keys of the user (i.e. the user’s
private key share (sk1i ) and the user’s private key skUi for signature) which are also required at
the authentication stage. Recall that the proposed system is a two-factor authentication system
and the system security depends on the secrecy of private keys of the user in this case.
3. Protection against Attack 3 - Attack against the feature extractor: An adversary cannot
gain access to the proposed system by performing an attack against the feature extractor. Let
us assume that an adversary targets the feature extractor and uses trojan horse in order to obtain
the biometric feature vector of the legitimate user. Even if the adversary can obtain the feature
vector, he cannot gain access to the proposed system since he does not know the private keys
of the user (e.g. the user’s private key share (sk1i ) and the user’s private key skUi for signature).
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Recall that the proposed system is a two-factor authentication system where a claimer must
provide biometric data together with her private key at each authentication attempt. In this case,
the system security depends on the secrecy of the private keys of the user.
4. Protection against Attack 4 - Tampering the communication channel between the fea-
ture extractor and the matcher: An adversary can neither gain access to the proposed
system nor can obtain biometric template of a user by performing an attack on the communi-
cation channel between the feature extractor and the matcher. Recall that the communication
channel between the feature extractor and the matcher is actually the communication channel
between the user and the verifier as depicted in Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.4. Thus, it may suffer
from several attacks:
i) Replay attack
ii) Man-in-the-middle attack
iii) Ciphertext-only attack
iv) Known plaintext attack
i)Replay attack in the communication channel between the feature extractor and the matcher:
Let us assume that an adversary eavesdrops on the communication channel between the user and
the verifier and records the exchanged messages in the proposed authentication protocol. In other
words, let us assume that the adversary wants to perform a replay attack in this communication
channel. In this case, the adversary aims either to use these data for deceiving the verifier and
gaining access to the proposed system or to obtain the biometric template of a user in order to
threaten privacy.
The proposed authentication protocol is secure against the replay attack in the communication
channel between the user and the verifier since
1. the user uses nonceUi at the first step of the proposed authentication protocol,
2. the verifier uses nonceV at the second step of the proposed authentication protocol,
3. the user signs the whole communication, SignskUi (Encpki(ri),Y,nonceUi ,nonceV ), during
the authentication stage at the third step of the proposed authentication protocol.
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Since the nonce is different for each authentication request, this makes the communication be-
tween the user and the verifier unique for each authentication session. Moreover, the adversary
cannot perform sign operation since he does not know the private key of the user skUi and he
must perform the third step of the authentication protocol for the new nonce introduced by the
verifier. Therefore, the adversary cannot gain access to the proposed system by performing re-
play attack in the communication channel between the feature extractor and the matcher. On
the other hand, the proposed authentication protocol preserves privacy of the user in case of
the replay attack in the communication channel between the user and the verifier since only
encrypted biometric templates can be obtained from the communication channel. Even if the
adversary obtains the private keys of the user, he cannot decrypt and compromise the biomet-
ric template of the user since the (2, 2) threshold homomorphic cryptosystem is used. In other
words, the adversary also needs private key share of the verifier in order to perform a successful
decryption.
ii)Man-in-the-middle attack attack in the communication channel between the feature ex-
tractor and the matcher: In the literature, man-in-the-middle attack is an active attack where
an adversary makes independent connections with the users and relays messages between them.
Let us assume that an adversary wants to perform man-in-the-middle attack in the communica-
tion channel between the user and the verifier. In this case, the adversary aims either to gain
access to the proposed system or obtain the biometric template of the user. When the adversary
eavesdrops on the communication channel between the user and the verifier, he can only obtain
the below items.
1. C′i , X, nonceUi from the first step of the proposed authentication protocol,
2. SignskUi (Ci),nonceV from the second step of the proposed authentication protocol, and
3. SignskUi (Encpki(ri),Y,nonceUi ,nonceV ) from the second step of the proposed authentica-
tion protocol.
However, all exchanged messages in the proposed authentication protocol are encrypted and
randomized and the adversary cannot perform decryption to learn the content since he does not
know the private keys of the user and the verifier. Thus, he cannot properly modify the content
of the exchanged messages in the proposed authentication protocol in order to gain access to the
proposed system as a legitimate user.
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iii) Ciphertext-only attack in the communication channel between the feature extractor and
the matcher: Another type of attack that can be performed in this communication channel is a
ciphertext-only attack (COA). The COA is an attack model for cryptanalysis where an adversary
is assumed to have access only to a set of ciphertexts. When corresponding plaintexts can be
deduced or private key is obtained, the COA is successful. For our case, biohashes (Bauthi) are
plaintexts and encryption of biohashes (Encpki(Bauthi)) are ciphertexts. Let us assume that the
adversary obtains encryption of biohashes (Encpki(Bauthi)) and he wants to gain access to the
proposed system. For this case, there are three options:
1. The adversary cannot deduce the plaintext (the user’s biohash (Bauthi)) from the ciphertext
(encryption of the user’s biohash (Encpki(Bauthi))) since he does not have the user’s private
key share (sk1i ).
2. The adversary cannot use the verifier in order to decrypt Encpki(Bauthi) since the verifier
only sends SignskUi (Ci) and nonceV where Ci = Encpki
(
Benrolli
)
to the user at the second
step of the proposed authentication protocol. Thus, the adversary does not obtain any
useful information from the verifier since the verifier only sends the data stored in the
database. Besides, it does not perform decryption and does not send these decrypted data
back to the adversary. Furthermore, since the adversary also does not have the user’s
private key share (sk1i ) and the verifier’s private key share (sk
2
i ), he cannot decrypt Ci.
3. The adversary cannot gain access to the proposed system even if he obtains biohash
(Bauthi) and encrypted biohashes (Encpki(Bauthi)) of the user without having her private
key share (sk1i ).
Therefore, the adversary cannot gain access to the proposed system by using the COA in the
communication channel between the user and the verifier.
iv)Known-plaintext attack in the communication channel between the feature extractor and
the matcher: In addition to the above mentioned attacks, an adversary can perform known-
plaintext attack (KPA) by tampering the communication channel between the user and the ver-
ifier. The KPA is an attack where the adversary has samples of plaintext and its encrypted
version. The adversary aims to reveal further secret information such as private keys by us-
ing these information and gain access to the system. Let us assume that the adversary obtains
biohashes (Bauthi) and encryption of biohashes (Encpki(Bauthi)) and he wants to gain access to
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the proposed system as a legitimate user. He needs to execute the authentication protocol in
order to gain access to the proposed system. In this manner, the adversary generates a random,
ri ∈R {0, 1}`. Thus, he can compute C′i = Encpki(ri + Bauthi) by using the user’s public key pki
since public key of the user is known by all. However, he cannot perform X = Decsk1i (C
′
i ) since
he does not know the user’s private key share (sk1i ). Therefore, he cannot execute the proposed
authentication protocol in order to enter the proposed system. Furthermore, the adversary can-
not obtain further information about the user’s private key share (sk1i ) from the communication
channel between the user and the verifier via the KPA since
1. all the exchanged messages are encrypted in the communication channel between the user
and the verifier,
2. the verifier can only send the encrypted data stored in the database to the adversary.
These messages do not help the adversary for deducing the private key of the user. Therefore,
the adversary cannot gain access to the proposed system by using the KPA in the communication
channel between the user and the verifier.
5. Protection against Attack 5 - Attack against matcher: An adversary cannot obtain
biometric template of a user even if he gains access to the proposed system by performing an
attack against the matcher. Let us assume that an adversary uses a Trojan horse for manipulating
the matcher and hence to gain access to the system. If an adversary gains access to the matcher,
clearly it can give access to whomever it wants and breaks the security of the system. However
in this case, even if the adversary can gain access to the proposed system, he cannot obtain the
biometric templates since the (2,2)-threshold homomorphic cryptosystem is used. Therefore,
the adversary cannot perform decryption since he does not know the private key share of the
user (i.e. sk1i ). Consequently, the proposed system preserves the privacy of the users.
6. Protection against Attack 6 - Attacks against database: An adversary can neither gain
access to the proposed system nor obtain biometric template of the users by performing an
attack against the database. Let us assume that an adversary aims to gain access to the proposed
system by performing this attack. In this case, the adversary must substitute or add data into
the database since erasing data from the database does not allow access to the proposed system
for the adversary. Let us again assume that the adversary adds data into the database (e.g.
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Table 7.2: The experimental results
Length of biohash
vector (bit)
Modulus(bit) Enrollment time (s) Authentication
protocol run (s)
0-256 256 0.3488 0.0080
257-512 512 2.1724 0.0341
513-1024 1024 16.3735 0.2180
1025-2048 2048 280.195 1.5528
encrypted version of the biohash of the adversary) or substitute data stored in the database. For
such cases, only adding data into the database or substituting data stored in the database is not
sufficient to gain access to the proposed system as a legitimate user since the adversary must
also successfully execute the proposed authentication protocol. Recall that the verifier verifies
the signature on SignskUi (Encpki(ri),Y,nonceUi ,nonceV ) at the beginning of the fourth step of
the proposed authentication protocol since adversary cannot generate a valid signature without
having the private key of the user skUi .
On the other hand, let us assume that the adversary aims to obtain the biometric templates of the
users by performing an attack on the database. In this case, he can only obtain encrypted versions
of the biohashes (Ci = Encpki
(
Benrolli
)
) belonging to the legitimate users. However, biohashes
are encrypted by using the (2, 2) threshold homomorphic cryptosystem which makes decryption
impossible without having both the user’s private key share (sk1i ) and the verifier’s private key
share (sk2i ). Consequently, the adversary cannot threaten the privacy of the user even if he steals
encrypted data from the database due to the (2,2)-threshold homomorphic cryptosystem.
7. Protection against Attack 7 - Tampering the communication channel between the database
and the matcher: An adversary can neither gain access to the proposed system nor obtain
biometric template of a user by tampering the communication channel between the database
and the matcher. Let us assume that an adversary aims to gain access to the proposed system by
performing this attack. The database sends Ci = Encpki
(
Benrolli
)
to the matcher. Thus, when the
adversary performs this attack, he can only obtain Ci = Encpki
(
Benrolli
)
. On the other hand, the
adversary cannot use these data in order to gain access to the proposed system as a legitimate
user since
1. he cannot decrypt it because he does not have the user’s private key share (sk1i ) and the
verifier’s private key share (sk2i ),
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2. he does not have the private key of the user skUi for signing the data.
Therefore, the adversary cannot successfully execute the proposed authentication protocol in
order to gain access to the proposed system even if he tampers the communication channel
between the database and the matcher. Furthermore, he cannot threaten the privacy of the users
since he cannot perform decryption on the obtained data Ci = Encpki
(
Benrolli
)
due to the (2,2)-
threshold homomorphic cryptosystem. Consequently, the proposed system also preserves the
privacy of the users.
8. Protection against Attack 8 - Override response: An adversary can neither gain access to
the proposed system nor obtain biometric template of a user by performing an override response
attack. The proposed system can easily be updated in order to overcome this attack as described
in the step 5 of the proposed authentication protocol. In the proposed authentication protocol,
the verifier signs its decision including the nonces generated during the authentication session
(i.e. either Sign(Accept, nonceUi , nonceV )or Sign (Reject, nonceUi , nonceV ) and then sends it
to the user. Thus, it is explicitly known that the decision is taken by the verifier and it cannot be
changed. The signature guarantees authenticity, integrity and origin of the data. The user must
provide the signed decision including the nonces generated during the authentication session to
the verifier in order to gain access to the system. In this case, the adversary cannot perform the
override response attack since he cannot generate the signature of the verifier. Even if he obtains
Sign(Accept), he cannot make replay attack since the nonces are also used in the response (e.g.
Sign(Accept, nonceUi). On the other hand, the adversary cannot obtain the biometric template
of a user by performing this attack since biometric data is never released at this step.
9. Protection against Attack 9 - Hill-climbing attack: An adversary can neither gain access
to the proposed system nor obtain the biometric template of a user by a hill-climbing attack. Let
us assume that an adversary aims to perform a hill-climbing attack by using the output of the
matcher. In the hill-climbing attack, the adversary improves quality of the synthetically created
biometric template by iteratively updating it using a specific modification scheme according to
the score given by the matcher. For a one factor authentication system which is only based
on biometric data, when the score exceeds a fixed decision threshold, the adversary can gain
access to the system. However, the proposed system is a two-factor authentication system where
biometric data and private key are needed for successful authentication. Even if the private
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keys of the user are compromised, the matcher does not output a score instead outputs just
an accept/reject decision (i.e. either Sign(Accept, nonceUi , nonceV )or Sign (Reject, nonceUi ,
nonceV ) in the proposed system. Consequently, the adversary cannot obtain the scores which
are needed for performing the hill-climbing attack. Moreover, the adversary cannot estimate the
biometric data of the user since he cannot reach the matching scores and hence the user privacy
is not threatened.
7.6 Complexity Analysis
In this section, we discuss the complexity of the THRIVE enrollment and authentication pro-
tocols. The complexity of the THRIVE enrollment and authentication protocols cover protocol
steps for the round complexity, exponentiation for the computational complexity and messages
sent to the parties for the communication complexity. Without loss of generality, we will provide
complexity of the THRIVE protocols using the (2,2)-threshold homomorphic Paillier cryptosys-
tem as an instance [115].
The round complexity of the enrollment protocol is only 1. For the computational complexity,
the enrollment protocol requires only 4 exponentiations for a user but 1 exponentiation for the
server. The enrollment protocol has only 2 encryption and 1 signature and 1 signature verifica-
tion for the communication complexity.
As regards the authentication protocol, two different encryption schemes are used, i.e., a con-
ventional public key operation for (pkUi , skUi) (e.g., for the conventional encryption scheme like
RSA) and (2, 2)-threshold homomorphic encryption scheme for (pki, (sk1i , sk
2
i )) (e.g.; for the
Paillier encryption). In the authentication protocol, there are only 4 rounds. For the computa-
tional complexity of the authentication protocol, the user computes 2 exponentiations for C′i , 2
exponentiations for the decryption shares X and Y , 1 exponentiation for the signature verifica-
tion, 2 exponentiations for C′′i , and 1 exponentiation for the signature during the first and the
third steps of the proposed protocol. Consequently, there are 8 exponentiations computed during
the authentication protocol for a user. On the other hand, the verifier computes 1 exponentiation
for the signature verification, 1 exponentiation for C′′i , and 4 exponentiations for the decryp-
tion shares Dsk2i (C
′
i ) and Dsk2i (C
′′
i ). Therefore, there are 6 exponentiations computed during the
authentication protocol for the verifier. In total, there are 14 exponentiations computed during
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the authentication protocol for the user and the verifier. The authentication protocol has only 1
encryption and 2 signature operations for the communication complexity.
7.7 Implementation of the Proposed System
In this section, we introduce implementation results of the THRIVE enrollment and authenti-
cation protocols. We implement the THRIVE enrollment and authentication protocols in Java
language on a PC which has Intel 2.27 GHz Core2 Duo processor and 4 GB RAM. In the pro-
tocol implementation, we use RSA for the signing scheme and Paillier Threshold scheme for
the encryption. In the proposed system, there are two protocol stages such as enrollment and
biometric authentication. During the enrollment stage, RSA signing certificates are generated
for both the user and the server in order to register a user into the server. Then, a new Paillier
threshold scheme is constructed between the user and the server for each enrollment and the
required prime numbers are generated in each construction. After that the enrollment protocol
is executed. We also utilize a Java library which implements the Paillier Threshold Encryption
systems [120] in our implementation. The security of the RSA depends on the difficulty of the
factorization of its own common modulus (n = pq). The Paillier encryption scheme is based
on the problem to decide whether is an n-th residue modulo n2. This problem is believed to be
computationally hard in the cryptographic domain, and is linked to the hardness to factorize its
own common modulus n = pq where n is the product of two large primes p and q. In order
to provide 80-bit security level for RSA signing, we have to use 1024-bit common composite
modulus (512-bit for p and 512 bit for q) for RSA signing. Similarly, the common modulus for
Paillier threshold system is also 1024-bit.
In our experiments, we simulate 1000 clients and a single server. We create random credentials
for each user. Both the user and the verifier are run on the same PC. A successful authentication
protocol run requires 0.218 seconds on average. The average time for the enrollment and the
authentication protocol run for different security parameters are depicted in Table II. The en-
rollment requires much higher than the authentication protocol because of the generation of the
common modulus. Recall that the enrollment time shown in Table II includes set-up time and
enrollment protocol execution time. Besides, it is clear that an implementation in C would be
much faster. Note that the maximum length of the biohash vector can be the number of mod-
ulus bits. For instance, if modulus is 1024 bit, the length of the biohash can be from 513 bit
(minimum) to 1024 bit (maximum).
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7.8 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we propose a novel biometric authentication system. The aim of the proposed
system is to increase security against adversary attacks defined in [4] when an adversary aims to
gain access to the system as a legitimate user and protect the privacy of the users by encrypting
the biometric templates stored in the database. We design new enrollment and authentication
protocols in order to increase the security against attacks reported in the literature and preserve
the privacy of the users. The proposed system can be used with any biometric feature extrac-
tion method which can produce binary templates or whose templates can be binarized. The
biohashing is chosen as an example binary biometric template generation system since it offers
satisfactory error rates and fast authentication. The comparison is performed in a randomized
domain in the authentication stage and the binary templates (e.g biohashes) are never released.
In addition to that, only encrypted binary templates are stored in the database. Since we use the
(2, 2)-threshold cryptosystem, the verifier cannot, in polynomial time, decrypt the data stored in
the database by himself. The user and the verifier can only decrypt the encryption of the binary
templates collaboratively. The proposed system can be used in applications where the user and
the verifier do not necessarily trust each other. Furthermore, we implement the proposed system
and a successful authentication protocol run requires 0.218 seconds on the average. Conse-
quently, it can be stated that the proposed system is sufficiently efficient to be used in the real
world applications.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
8.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, we address performance, security and privacy aspects of biohashing methods. We
propose new biohashing methods in order to increase authentication performance of the existing
random projection based biohashing methods. We develop several biohashing methods in order
to improve the performance of the existing random projection based biohashing methods even
for the key-stolen scenario. First, we try to find a better projection matrix in order to reduce the
Hamming distance between the biometric hash vectors which represent the same user but differ
due to variations in the biometric data. We develop a new face image hashing method based on
optimal linear transform under colored Gaussian noise assumption. The simulation results show
that the proposed biometric hashing method has much better performance in comparison to the
random projection based biometric hashing methods in the literature [2, 3]. Furthermore, in gen-
eral, performance of the proposed method increases with the increasing length of the biometric
hash vector. Next, we develop a new face image hashing method based on a proposed technique
that we call discriminative projection selection to reduce verification errors. This technique se-
lects the rows of an RP matrix, which is a user dependent dimension reduction matrix, by using
the Fisher criterion. In addition, we employ Gaussian mixture model at the quantization step to
obtain more distinct face image hash vectors for each user. The proposed method has better per-
formance in terms of EER in comparison to the Ngo et al.’s methods [2, 3]. As the length of face
image hash vector decreases, the proposed method shows better improvement since the proposed
dimension reduction matrix better preserves the pair-wise distances between feature vectors in
the reduced dimension subspace in comparison with the traditional random projection matrix.
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The best results are usually obtained with 128 or 256 bits. Finally, we propose another new bio-
metric hashing method which depends on Error-Correcting Output Codes (ECOC). We improve
the performance of the random projection based biometric hashing scheme by introducing a new
quantization method that attempts to optimize biometric hash vectors by using the ideas from
ECOC classifiers. The proposed scheme shows superior performance in comparison with Ngo
et al.’s method. The proposed scheme approximately reduces the EER by half in most of the
cases. Furthermore, even in some cases, the proposed scheme perfectly separates the genuine
and imposter users with no errors. Discriminative biohashing method in Chapter 4 and ECOC
guided biohashing in Chapter 5 have better performance especially in key-stolen scenario in
comparison with the random projection based biohashing methods. Discriminative biohashing
method performs better for biohash vectors with 64 and 128 bits since this method can select
more discriminative bits. As the length of the biohash vector increases, there is not enough dis-
criminative bits to be selected. Thus, the performance of the discriminative biohashing method
decreases. On the other hand, the performance of the ECOC guided biohashing increases with
the increasing biohash vector length since it is based on optimization of the Hamming distance
between the columns and rows of the codeword matrix which contains biohashes in its rows.
Dimension reduction and quantization phases introduces verification errors due to information
loss at these phases. From the simulation results, it can be stated that ECOC guided biohashing
performs better than discriminative biohashing method. We conclude that information loss at
the quantization phase is much more than information loss at the dimension reduction phase.
Thus, improving the quantization phase more significantly increases the system performance.
In addition to these works, we analyze the security and privacy preservation aspects of the ran-
dom projection based biohashing methods by performing various attacks against them. We
classify threats against these systems into two groups: 1) Security threats, 2)Privacy threats.
For security threats, we demonstrate the performance of the proposed methods under key-stolen
scenario where an attacker gets the secret key of the legitimate user but does not have her face
image. For privacy threats, we perform attacks against random projection based biohashing
schemes in order to test its privacy preservation capability via its irreversibility property. We
propose new attack methods based on minimum norm solutions for random projection based
biohashing schemes for face images. We can reconstruct the biometric data (not exactly the
same but similar) of the user by using the minimum norm solutions when the biohash and the
secret key of the user are stolen. Therefore, we show that an attacker can threaten the privacy of
the users. We also demonstrate that the attacker can also threaten the security of the system by
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using the reconstructed image and the secret key of the user even if the user changes her secret
key.
Finally, we propose a new biometric verification and template protection system which we call
the THRIVE system. The system includes novel enrollment and authentication protocols based
on threshold homomorphic encryption in which the private key is shared between the user and
the verifier. The system is designed for the malicious attack model where neither of the parties
is assumed to be honest. Security of the system is enhanced using a two factor authentication
scheme involving the users private key and the biometric data. In the proposed system, only en-
crypted binary biometric templates are stored in the database and verification is performed via
homomorphically randomized templates, hence, original templates are never revealed even dur-
ing authentication. Since threshold homomorphic encryption scheme is used, a malicious party
cannot perform decryption on encrypted templates of the users in the database using a single
key. We analyze the security and privacy preservation capability of the proposed system against
various adversary attacks. The analysis results show that the system is robust against malicious
attacks and preserves privacy of the users. The proposed system is suitable for applications
where the user and the verifier do not necessarily trust each other. The system can be used
with any biometric modality and biometric feature extraction scheme whose output templates
can be binarized. We implemented the proposed THRIVE system and found that a successful
authentication protocol run requires 0.218 seconds on average. Consequently, the system can be
efficiently used in real life applications.
8.2 Future Work
In this thesis, we address security and privacy issues as well as verification performance of the
biohashing methods. We work on face images but different biometric modalities as well as
multi-modal biometrics can be studied as future work. For performance aspects, the feature ex-
traction has utmost importance in a biohashing method. Better verification performance can be
achieved with better feature extraction methods (e.g. Zernike moments for face images). Fixed
length feature extraction methods can be very useful for developing new biohashing methods.
Furthermore, the quantization is one of the most critical phases in the biohashing schemes since
it causes verification errors. The verification performance of the biohashing methods can be
improved by using better quantization methods.
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In addition, there may be different security and privacy attack scenarios against biohashing meth-
ods. Security and privacy preservation capability of the biohashing methods can be tested with
these attack scenarios. For instance, Hellman et al. propose rainbow tables in order to crack
cryptographic hashed passwords [121]. These tables contain pre-computed values and are used
for reversing cryptographic hash functions. Their aim is to recover the plaintext password by
using only a hashed value. This idea can be adopted to attacks against the biohashing methods.
In this attack scenario, an attacker gets the secret key and the biohash of a user. The user is not
aware that her secret key and biohash are stolen. The attacker also has a face image database
containing face images which do not belong to any legitimate user. He computes biohashes by
using the face images and the secret key of the user. Then, he computes the Hamming distance
between the original biohash and the computed biohashes. He uses the face image whose bio-
hash has the minimum Hamming distance with the original biohash. He uses this face image and
the secret key of the user to gain access to the system. In another attack scenario, the attacker
again gets the secret key and the biohash of a user. The attacker applies exactly the same method
in order to find a face image. Consequently, the attacker uses this face image and the secret key
of the user to gain access to the system. However, the user notices that her biohash is stolen
and changes her secret key for updating her biohash. These attack scenarios can be performed
against the biohashing methods as future work. Moreover, security and privacy attacks can be
investigated under insider and outsider attacker models. The security and privacy metrics can
be proposed in order to evaluate the security and privacy preservation capability of the biohash-
ing methods. The cryptographic protocols which are developed for the THRIVE system can be
analyzed by using formal methods.
Finally, new cryptographic protocols can be proposed for biohashing methods according to the
usage scenario and for different attack models. Fully homomorphic encryption methods can be
used for securing biometric template as well as ensuring privacy.
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